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Abstrat
Adjustable autonomy refers to entities dynamially varying their own autonomy, trans-
ferring deision-making ontrol to other entities (typially agents transferring ontrol to
human users) in key situations. Determining whether and when suh transfers-of-ontrol
should our is arguably the fundamental researh problem in adjustable autonomy. Pre-
vious work has investigated various approahes to addressing this problem but has often
foused on individual agent-human interations. Unfortunately, domains requiring ollabo-
ration between teams of agents and humans reveal two key shortomings of these previous
approahes. First, these approahes use rigid one-shot transfers of ontrol that an result in
unaeptable oordination failures in multiagent settings. Seond, they ignore osts (e.g.,
in terms of time delays or eets on ations) to an agent's team due to suh transfers-of-
ontrol.
To remedy these problems, this artile presents a novel approah to adjustable auton-
omy, based on the notion of a transfer-of-ontrol strategy. A transfer-of-ontrol strategy
onsists of a onditional sequene of two types of ations: (i) ations to transfer deision-
making ontrol (e.g., from an agent to a user or vie versa) and (ii) ations to hange an
agent's pre-speied oordination onstraints with team members, aimed at minimizing
misoordination osts. The goal is for high-quality individual deisions to be made with
minimal disruption to the oordination of the team. We present a mathematial model
of transfer-of-ontrol strategies. The model guides and informs the operationalization of
the strategies using Markov Deision Proesses, whih selet an optimal strategy, given an
unertain environment and osts to the individuals and teams. The approah has been
arefully evaluated, inluding via its use in a real-world, deployed multi-agent system that
assists a researh group in its daily ativities.
1. Introdution
Exiting, emerging appliation areas ranging from intelligent homes (Lesser et al., 1999), to
routine organizational oordination (Pynadath et al., 2000), to eletroni ommere (Collins
et al., 2000a), to long-term spae missions (Dorais et al., 1998) utilize the deision-making
skills of both agents and humans. These new appliations have brought forth an inreasing
interest in agents' adjustable autonomy (AA), i.e., in entities dynamially adjusting their own
level of autonomy based on the situation (Mulsiner & Pell, 1999). Many of these exiting
appliations will not be deployed unless reliable AA reasoning is a entral omponent. With
AA, an entity need not make all deisions autonomously; rather it an hoose to redue its
own autonomy and transfer deision-making ontrol to other users or agents, when doing so
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is expeted to have some net benet (Dorais et al., 1998; Barber, Goel, & Martin, 2000a;
Hexmoor & Kortenkamp, 2000).
A entral problem in AA is to determine whether and when transfers of deision-making
ontrol should our. A key hallenge is to balane two potentially oniting goals. On the
one hand, to ensure that the highest-quality deisions are made, an agent an transfer on-
trol to a human user (or another agent) whenever that user has superior deision-making
expertise.
1
On the other hand, interrupting a user has high osts and the user may be
unable to make and ommuniate a deision, thus suh transfers-of-ontrol should be min-
imized. Previous work has examined several dierent tehniques that attempt to balane
these two oniting goals and thus address the transfer-of-ontrol problem. For example,
one tehnique suggests that deision-making ontrol should be transferred if the expeted
utility of doing so is higher than the expeted utility of making an autonomous deision
(Horvitz, Jaobs, & Hovel, 1999). A seond tehnique uses unertainty as the sole rationale
for deiding who should have ontrol, foring the agent to relinquish ontrol to the user
whenever unertainty is high (Gunderson & Martin, 1999). Yet other tehniques transfer
ontrol to a user if an erroneous autonomous deision ould ause signiant harm (Dorais
et al., 1998) or if the agent laks the apability to make the deision (Ferguson, Allen, &
Miller, 1996).
Unfortunately, these previous approahes to transfer-of-ontrol reasoning and indeed
most previous work in AA, have foused on domains involving a single agent and a single
user, isolated from interations with other entities. When applied to interating teams of
agents and humans, where interation between an agent and a human impats the inter-
ation with other entities, these tehniques an lead to dramati failures. In partiular,
the presene of other entities as team members introdues a third goal of maintaining o-
ordination (in addition to the two goals already mentioned above), whih these previous
tehniques fail to address. Failures our for two reasons. Firstly, these previous tehniques
ignore team related fators, suh as osts to the team due to inorret deisions or due to
delays in deisions during suh transfers-of-ontrol. Seondly (and more importantly), these
tehniques use one-shot transfers-of-ontrol, rigidly ommitting to one of two hoies: (i)
transfer ontrol and wait for input (hoie H) or (ii) at autonomously (hoie A). However,
given interating teams of agents and humans, either hoie an lead to ostly failures if the
entity with ontrol fails to make or report a deision in a way that maintains oordination.
For instane, a human user might be unable to provide the required input due to a tem-
porary ommuniation failure; this may ause an agent to fail in its part of a joint ation,
as this joint ation may be dependent on the user's input. On the other hand, foring a
less apable entity to make a deision simply to avoid misoordination an lead to poor
deisions with signiant onsequenes. Indeed, as seen in Setion 2.2, when we applied a
rigid transfer-of-ontrol deision-making to a domain involving teams of agents and users,
it failed dramatially.
Yet, many emerging appliations do involve multiple agents and multiple humans ating
ooperatively towards joint goals. To address the shortomings of previous AA work in suh
domains, this artile introdues the notion of a transfer-of-ontrol strategy. A transfer-of-
ontrol strategy onsists of a pre-dened, onditional sequene of two types of ations: (i)
1. While the AA problem in general involves transferring ontrol from one entity to another, in this paper,
we will typially fous on interations involving autonomous agents and human users.
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ations to transfer deision-making ontrol (e.g., from an agent to a user or vie versa);
(ii) ations to hange an agent's pre-speied oordination onstraints with team members,
rearranging ativities as needed (e.g., reordering tasks to buy time to make the deision).
The agent exeutes suh a strategy by performing the ations in order, transferring ontrol to
the speied entity and hanging oordination as required, until some point in time when the
entity urrently in ontrol exerises that ontrol and makes the deision. Thus, the previous
hoies of H or A are just two of many dierent and possibly more omplex transfer-of-
ontrol strategies. For instane, an ADAH strategy implies that an agent initially attempts
to make an autonomous deision. If the agent makes the deision autonomously the strategy
exeution ends there. However, there is a hane that it is unable to make the deision
in a timely manner, perhaps beause its omputational resoures are busy with higher
priority tasks. To avoid misoordination the agent exeutes a D ation whih hanges the
oordination onstraints on the ativity. For example, a D ation ould be to inform other
agents that the oordinated ation will be delayed, thus inurring a ost of inonveniene
to others but buying more time to make the deision. If it still annot make the deision, it
will eventually take ation H, transferring deision-making ontrol to the user and waiting
for a response. In general, strategies an involve all available entities and ontain many
ations to hange oordination onstraints. While suh strategies may be useful in single-
agent single-human settings, they are partiularly ritial in general multiagent settings, as
disussed below.
Transfer-of-ontrol strategies provide a exible approah to AA in omplex systems
with many ators. By enabling multiple transfers-of-ontrol between two (or more) entities,
rather than rigidly ommitting to one entity (i.e., A orH), a strategy attempts to provide the
highest quality deision, while avoiding oordination failures. In partiular, in a multiagent
setting there is often unertainty about whether an entity will make a deision and when it
will do so, e.g., a user may fail to respond, an agent may not be able to make a deision as
expeted or a ommuniation hannel may fail. A strategy addresses suh unertainty by
planning multiple transfers of ontrol to over for suh ontingenies. For instane, with the
ADH strategy, an agent ultimately transfers ontrol to a human to attempt to ensure that
some response will be provided in ase the agent is unable to at. Furthermore, expliit
oordination-hange ations, i.e., D ations, redue misoordination eets, for a ost, while
better deisions are being made. Finally, sine the utility of transferring ontrol or hanging
oordination is dependent on the ations taken afterwards, the agent must plan a strategy
in advane to nd the sequene of ations that maximizes team benets. For example,
reating to the urrent situation and repeatedly taking and giving ontrol as in the strategy
ADHADH : : : may be more ostly than planning ahead, making a bigger oordination
hange, and using a shorter ADH strategy. We have developed a deision theoreti model
of suh strategies, that allows the expeted utility of a strategy to be alulated and, hene,
strategies to be ompared.
Thus, a key AA problem is to selet the right strategy, i.e., one that provides the
benet of high-quality deisions without risking signiant osts in interrupting the user and
misoordination with the team. Furthermore, an agent must selet the right strategy despite
signiant unertainty. Markov deision proesses (MDPs) (Puterman, 1994) are a natural
hoie for implementing suh reasoning beause they expliitly represent osts, benets and
unertainty as well as doing lookahead to examine the potential onsequenes of sequenes
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of ations. In Setion 4, a general reward funtion is presented for an MDP that results in an
agent arefully balaning risks of inorret autonomous deisions, potential misoordination
and osts due to hanging oordination between team members. Detailed experiments were
performed on the MDP, the key results of whih are as follows. As the relative importane
of entral fators, suh as the ost of misoordination, was varied the resulting MDP poliies
varied in a desirable way, i.e., the agent made more deisions autonomously if the ost of
transferring ontrol to other entities inreased. Other experiments reveal a phenomenon not
reported before in the literature: an agent may at more autonomously when oordination
hange osts are either too low or too high, but in a \middle" range, the agent tends to at
less autonomously.
Our researh has been onduted in the ontext of a real-world multi-agent system,
alled Eletri Elves (E-Elves) (Chalupsky, Gil, Knoblok, Lerman, Oh, Pynadath, Russ,
& Tambe, 2001; Pynadath et al., 2000), that we have used for over six months at the
University of Southern California, Information Sienes Institute. The E-Elves assists a
group of researhers and a projet assistant in their daily ativities, providing an exiting
opportunity to test AA ideas in a real environment. Individual user proxy agents alled
Friday (from Robinson Crusoe's servant Friday) at in a team to assist with resheduling
meetings, ordering meals, nding presenters and other day-to-day ativities. Over the ourse
of several months, MDP-based AA reasoning was used around the lok in the E-Elves,
making many thousands of autonomy deisions. Despite the unpreditability of the user's
behavior and the agent's limited sensing abilities, the MDP onsistently made sensible
AA deisions. Moreover, many times the agent performed several transfers-of-ontrol to
ope with ontingenies suh as a user not responding. One lesson learned when atually
deploying the system was that sometimes users wished to inuene the AA reasoning, e.g.,
to ensure that ontrol was transferred to them in partiular irumstanes. To allow users
to inuene the AA reasoning, safety onstraints are introdued that allow users to prevent
agents from taking partiular ations or ensuring that they do take partiular ations.
These safety onstraints provide guarantees on the behavior of the AA reasoning, making
the basi approah more generally appliable and, in partiular, making it more appliable
to domains where mistakes have serious onsequenes.
The rest of this artile is organized as follows. Setion 2 gives a detailed desription of the
AA problem and presents the Eletri Elves as a motivating example appliation. Setion
3 presents a formal model of transfer-of-ontrol strategies for AA. (Readers not interested
in the mathematial details may wish to skip over Setion 3.) The operationalization of
the strategies via MDPs is desribed in Setion 4. In Setion 5, the results of detailed
experiments are presented. Setion 6 looks at related work, inluding how earlier AA work
an be analyzed within the strategies framework. Setion 7 gives a summary of the artile.
Finally, Setion 8 outlines areas where the work ould be extended to make it appliable to
more appliations.
2. Adjustable Autonomy { The Problem
The general AA problem has not been previously formally dened in the literature, parti-
ularly for a multiagent ontext. In the following, a formal denition of the problem is given
so as to learly dene the task for the AA reasoning. The team, whih may onsist entirely
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of agents or inlude humans, has some joint ativity, . Eah entity in the team works
ooperatively on the joint ativity. The agent, A, has a role, , in the team. Depending
on the spei task, some or all of the roles will need to be performed suessfully in order
for the joint ativity to sueed. The primary goal of the agent is the suess of  whih
it pursues by performing . Performing  requires that one or more non-trivial deisions
are made. To make a deision, d, the agent an draw upon n other entities from a set
E = fe
1
: : : e
n
g, whih typially inludes the agent itself. Eah entity in E (e.g., a human
user) is apable of making deision d. The entities in E are not neessarily part of the
team performing . Dierent agents and users will have diering abilities to make deisions
due to available omputational resoures, aess to relevant information, et. Coordination
onstraints, , exist between  and the roles of other members of the team. For example,
various roles might need to be exeuted simultaneously or in a ertain order or with some
ombined quality or total ost. A ritial faet of the suessful ompletion of the joint task
, given its jointness, is to ensure that oordination between team members is maintained,
i.e.,  are not violated. Thus, we an desribe an AA problem instane with the tuple:
hA;; ;; d; Ei.
From an AA perspetive, the agent an take two types of ations for a deision, d.
First, it an transfer ontrol to an entity in E apable of making that deision. In general,
there are no restritions on when, how often or for how long deision-making ontrol an
be transferred to a partiular entity. Typially, the agent an also transfer deision-making
ontrol to itself. In general, we assume that when the agent transfers ontrol, it does not
have any guarantee on the exat time of response or exat quality of the deision made by
the entity to whih ontrol is transferred. In fat, in some ases it will not know whether
the entity will be able to make a deision at all or even whether the entity will know it has
deision-making ontrol, e.g., if ontrol was transferred via email, the agent may not know
if the user atually read the email.
The seond type of ation that an agent an take is to request hanges in the oor-
dination onstraints, , between team members. A oordination hange gives the agent
the possibility of hanging the requirements surrounding the deision to be made, e.g., the
required timing, ost or quality of the deision, whih may allow it to better fulll its re-
sponsibilities. A oordination hange might involve reordering or delaying tasks or it may
involve hanging roles, or it may be a more dramati hange where the team pursues  in
a ompletely dierent way. Changing oordination has some ost, but it may be better
to inur this ost than violate oordination onstraints, i.e., inur misoordination osts.
Misoordination between team members will our for many reasons, e.g., a onstraint that
limits the total ost of a joint task might be violated if one team member inurs a higher
than expeted ost and other team members do not redue their osts. In this artile, we
are primarily onerned with onstraints related to the timing of roles, e.g., ordering on-
straints or requirements on simultaneous exeution. This in turn, usually requires that the
agent guards against delayed deisions although it an also require that a deision is not
made too soon.
Thus, the AA problem for the agent, given a problem instane, hA;; ;; d; Ei, is to
hoose the transfer-of-ontrol or oordination-hange ations that maximizes the overall
expeted utility of the team. In the remainder of this setion we desribe a onrete, real-
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world domain for AA (Setion 2.1) and an initial failed approah that motivates our solution
(Setion 2.2).
2.1 The Eletri Elves
This researh was initiated in response to issues that arose in a real appliation and the
resulting approah was extensively tested in the day-to-day running of that appliation.
The Eletri Elves (E-Elves) is a projet at USC/ISI to deploy an agent organization in
support of the daily ativities of a human organization (Pynadath et al., 2000; Chalupsky
et al., 2001). We believe this appliation to be fairly typial of future generation appli-
ations involving teams of agents and humans. The operation of a human organization
requires the performane of many everyday tasks to ensure oherene in organizational
ativities, e.g., monitoring the status of ativities, gathering information and keeping ev-
eryone informed of hanges in ativities. Teams of software agents an aid organizations
in aomplishing these tasks, failitating oherent funtioning and rapid, exible response
to rises. A number of underlying AI tehnologies support the E-Elves, e.g., tehnologies
devoted to agent-human interations, agent oordination, aessing multiple heterogeneous
information soures, dynami assignment of organizational tasks, and deriving information
about organization members (Chalupsky et al., 2001). While these tehnologies are useful,
AA is fundamental to the eetive integration of the E-Elves into the day-to-day running
of a real organization and, hene, is the fous of this paper.
The basi design of the E-Elves is shown in Figure 1(a). Eah agent proxy is alled
Friday (after Robinson Crusoes' man-servant Friday) and ats on behalf of its user in the
agent team. The design of the Friday proxies is disussed in detail in (Tambe, Pynadath,
Chauvat, Das, & Kaminka, 2000) (where they are referred to as TEAMCORE proxies).
Currently, Friday an perform several tasks for its user. If a user is delayed to a meeting,
Friday an reshedule the meeting, informing other Fridays, who in turn inform their users.
If there is a researh presentation slot open, Friday may respond to the invitation to present
on behalf of its user. Friday an also order its user's meals (see Figure 2(a)) and trak the
user's loation, posting it on a Web page. Friday ommuniates with users using wireless
devies, suh as personal digital assistants (PALM VIIs) and WAP-enabled mobile phones,
and via user workstations. Figure 1(b) shows a PALM VII onneted to a Global Positioning
Servie (GPS) devie, for traking users' loations and enabling wireless ommuniation
between Friday and a user. Eah Friday's team behavior is based on a teamwork model,
alled STEAM (Tambe, 1997). STEAM enodes and enfores the onstraints between roles
that are required for the suess of the joint ativity, e.g., meeting attendees should arrive at
a meeting simultaneously. When a role within the team needs to be lled, STEAM requires
that a team member is assigned responsibility for that role. To nd the best suited person,
the team autions o the role, allowing it to onsider a ombination of fators and assign
the best suited user. Friday an bid on behalf of its user, indiating whether its user is
apable and/or willing to ll a partiular role. Figure 2(b) shows a tool that allows users
to view autions in progress and intervene if they so desire. In the aution in progress, Jay
Modi's Friday has bid that Jay is apable of giving the presentation, but is unwilling to do
so. Paul Serri's agent has the highest bid and was eventually alloated the role.
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Friday Friday
Friday Friday
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Overall E-Elves arhiteture, showing Friday agents interating with users.
(b)Palm VII for ommuniating with users and GPS devie for deteting their
loation.
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AA is ritial to the suess of the E-Elves sine, despite the range of sensing devies,
Friday has onsiderable unertainty about the user's intentions and even loation; hene,
Friday will not always have the appropriate information to make orret deisions. On the
other hand, while the user has the required information, Friday annot ontinually ask the
user for input, sine suh interruptions are disruptive and time-onsuming. There are four
deisions in the E-Elves to whih AA reasoning is applied: (i) whether a user will attend a
meeting on time; (ii) whether to lose an aution for a role; (iii) whether the user is willing
to perform an open team role; and (iv) if and what to order for lunh. In this paper, we
fous on the AA reasoning for two of those deisions: whether a user will attend a meeting
on time and whether to lose an aution for a role. The deision as to whether a user will
attend a meeting on time is the most often used and most diÆult of the deisions Friday
faes. We briey desribe the deision to lose an aution and later show how an insight
provided by the model of strategies led to a signiant redution in the amount of ode
required to implement the AA reasoning for that deision. The deision to volunteer a user
for a meeting is similar to the earlier deisions, and omitted for brevity; the deision to order
lunh is urrently implemented in a simpler fashion and is not (at least as yet) illustrative
of the full set of omplexities.
A entral deision for Friday, whih we desribe in terms of our problem formulation,
hA;; ;; d; Ei, is whether its user will attend a meeting at the urrently sheduled meet-
ing time. In this ase, Friday is the agent, A. The joint ativity, , is for the meeting
attendees to attend the meeting simultaneously. Friday ats as proxy for its user, hene
its role, , is to ensure that its user arrives at the urrently sheduled meeting time. The
oordination onstraint, , between Friday's role and the roles of other Fridays is that they
our simultaneously, i.e., the users must attend at the urrently sheduled time. If any
attendee arrives late, or not at all, the time of all the attendees is wasted; on the other
hand, delaying a meeting is disruptive to users' shedules. The deision, d, is whether the
user will attend the meeting or not and ould be made by either Friday or the user, i.e.,
E = fuser;Fridayg. Clearly, the user will be often better plaed to make this deision.
However, if Friday transfers ontrol to the user for the deision, it must guard against mis-
oordination, i.e., having the other attendees wait, while waiting for a user response. Some
deisions are potentially ostly, e.g., inorretly telling the other attendees that the user
will not attend, and Friday should avoid taking them autonomously. To buy more time for
the user to make the deision or for itself to gather more information, Friday ould hange
oordination onstraints with a D ation. Friday has several dierent D ations at its dis-
posal, inluding delaying the meeting by dierent lengths of time, as well as being able to
anel the meeting entirely. The user an also request a D ation, e.g., via the dialog box in
Figure 5(a), to buy more time to make it to the meeting. If the user deides a D is required,
Friday is the onduit through whih other Fridays (and hene their users) are informed.
Friday must selet a sequene of ations, either transferring ontrol to the user, delaying or
anelling the meeting or autonomously announing that the user will or will not attend,
to maximize the utility of the team.
The seond AA deision that we look at is the deision to lose an aution for an open
role and assign a user to that role.
2
In this ase, the joint ativity, , is the group researh
2. There are also roles for submitting bids to the aution but the AA for those deisions is simpler, hene
we do not fous on them here.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Friday transferring ontrol to the user for a deision whether to order lunh.
(b) The E-Elves aution monitoring tool.
meeting and the role, , is to be the autioneer. Users will not always submit bids for the
role immediately; in fat, the bids may be spread out over several days, or some users might
not bid at all. The spei deision, d, on whih we fous is whether to lose the aution
and assign the role or ontinue waiting for inoming bids. One individual team members
provide their bids, the autioneer agent or human team leader deides on a presenter based
on that input (E = fuser; autioneer agentg). The team expets a willing presenter to do
a high-quality researh presentation, whih means the presenter will need some time to
prepare. Thus, the oordination onstraint,  is that the most apable, willing user must
be alloated to the role with enough time to prepare the presentation. Despite individually
responsible ations, the agent team may reah a highly undesirable deision, e.g., assigning
the same user week after week, hene there is advantage in getting the human team leader's
input. The agent faes unertainty (e.g., will better bids ome in?), osts (i.e., the later
the assignment, the less time the presenter has to prepare), and needs to onsider the
possibility that the human team leader has some speial preferene about who should do
a presentation at some partiular meeting. By transferring ontrol, the agent allows the
human team leader to make an assignment. For this deision, a oordination-hange ation,
D, would reshedule the researh meeting. However, relative to the ost of anelling the
meeting, the ost of resheduling is too high for resheduling to be a useful ation.
2.2 Deision-Tree Approah
One logial avenue of attak on the AA problem for the E-Elves was to apply an approah
used in a previously reported, suessful meeting sheduling system, in partiular CAP
(Mithell, Caruana, Freitag, MDermott, & Zabowski, 1994). Like CAP, Friday learned
user preferenes using C4.5 deision-tree learning (Quinlan, 1993). Friday reorded values
of a dozen arefully seleted attributes and the user's preferred ation (identied by asking
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the user) whenever it had to make a deision. Friday used the data to learn a deision
tree that enoded its autonomous deision making. For AA, Friday also asked if the user
wanted suh deisions taken autonomously in the future. From these responses, Friday
used C4.5 to learn a seond deision tree whih enoded its rules for transferring ontrol.
Thus, if the seond deision tree indiated that Friday should at autonomously, it would
take the ation suggested by the rst deision tree. Initial tests with the C4.5 approah
were promising (Tambe et al., 2000), but a key problem soon beame apparent. When
Friday enountered a deision for whih it had learned to transfer ontrol to the user, it
would wait indenitely for the user to make the deision, even though this ination aused
misoordination with teammates. In partiular, other team members would arrive at the
meeting loation, waiting for a response from the user's Friday, but they would end up
ompletely wasting their time as no response arrived. To address this problem, if a user
did not respond within a xed time limit (ve minutes), Friday took an autonomous ation.
Although performane improved, when the resulting system was deployed 24/7 it led to
some dramati failures, inluding:
1. Example 1: Tambe's (a user) Friday inorretly anelled a meeting with the division
diretor beause Friday over-generalized from training examples.
2. Example 2: Pynadath's (another user) Friday inorretly anelled the group's weekly
researh meeting when a time-out fored the hoie of an (inorret) autonomous
ation.
3. Example 3: A Friday delayed a meeting almost 50 times, eah time by 5 minutes.
It was orretly applying a learned rule but ignoring the nuisane to the rest of the
meeting partiipants.
4. Example 4: Tambe's Friday automatially volunteered him for a presentation, but he
was atually unwilling. Again Friday over-generalized from a few examples and when
a timeout ourred it took an undesirable autonomous ation.
Clearly, in a team ontext, rigidly transferring ontrol to one agent (user) failed. Fur-
thermore, using a time-out that rigidly transferred ontrol bak to the agent, when it was
not apable of making a high-quality deision, also failed. In partiular, the agent needed
to better avoid taking risky deisions by expliitly onsidering their osts (example 1), or
take lower ost ations to delay meetings to buy the user more time to respond (example 2
and 4). Furthermore, as example 3 showed, the agent needed to plan ahead, to avoid taking
ostly sequenes of ations that ould be replaed by a single less ostly ation (example
3). In theory, using C4.5 Friday might have eventually been able to learn rules that would
suessfully balane osts and deal with unertainty and handle all the speial ases and so
on, but a very large amount of training data would be required.
3. Strategies for Adjustable Autonomy
To avoid rigid one-shot transfers of ontrol and allow team osts to be onsidered, we
introdue the notion of a transfer-of-ontrol strategy, whih is dened as follows:
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Denition 3.1 A transfer-of-ontrol strategy is a pre-dened, onditional sequene of two
types of ations: (i) ations to transfer deision-making ontrol (e.g., from an agent to
a user or other agents, or vie versa) and (ii) ations to hange an agent's pre-speied
oordination onstraints with team members, aimed at minimizing misoordination osts.
The agent exeutes a transfer-of-ontrol strategy by performing the speied ations in
sequene, transferring ontrol to the speied entity and hanging oordination as required,
until some point in time when the entity urrently in ontrol exerises that ontrol and
makes the deision. Considering multi-step strategies allows an agent to exploit deision-
making soures onsidered too risky to exploit without the possibility of retaking ontrol.
For example, ontrol ould be transferred to a very apable but not always available deision
maker then taken bak if the deision was not made before serious misoordination ourred.
More omplex strategies, potentially involving several oordination hanges, give the agent
the option to try several deision-making soures or to be more exible in getting input from
high-quality deision makers. As a result, transfer-of-ontrol strategies speially allow an
agent to avoid ostly errors, suh as those enumerated in the previous setion.
3
Given an AA problem instane, hA;; ;; d; Ei, agent A an transfer deision-making
ontrol for a deision d to any entity e
i
2 E, and we denote suh a transfer-of-ontrol
ation with the symbol representing the entity, i.e., transferring ontrol to e
i
is denoted as
e
i
. When the agent transfers deision-making ontrol, it may stipulate a limit on the time
that it will wait for a response from that entity. To apture this additional stipulation,
we denote transfer-of-ontrol ations with this time limit, e.g., e
i
(t) represents that e
i
has
deision-making ontrol for a maximum time of t. Suh an ation has two possible outomes:
either e
i
responds before time t and makes the deision, or it does not respond and deision
d remains unmade at time t. In addition, the agent has some mehanism by whih it
an hange oordination onstraints (denoted D) to hange the expeted timing of the
deision. The D ation hanges the oordination onstraints, , between team members.
The ation has an assoiated value, D
value
, whih speies its magnitude (i.e., how muh
the D has alleviated the temporal pressure), and a ost, D
ost
, whih speies the prie paid
for making the hange. We an onatenate suh ations to speify a omplete transfer-
of-ontrol strategy. For instane, the strategy H(5)A would speify that the agent rst
relinquishes ontrol and asks entity H (denoting the Human user). If the user responds
with a deision within ve minutes, then there is no need to go further. If not, then the
agent proeeds to the next transfer-of-ontrol ation in the sequene. In this example, this
next ation, A, speies that the agent itself make the deision and omplete the task.
No further transfers of ontrol our in this ase. We an dene the spae of all possible
strategies with the following regular expression:
S = (E R)((E R) +D) (1)
where (E R) is all possible ombinations of entity and maximum time.
For readability, we will frequently omit the time speiations from the transfer-of-
ontrol ations and instead write just the order in whih the agent transfers ontrol among
3. In some domains, it may make sense to attempt to get input from more than one entity at one, hene
requiring strategies that have ations that might be exeuted in parallel. However, in this work, as a rst
step, we do not onsider suh strategies. Furthermore, they are not relevant for the domains at hand.
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the entities and exeutes Ds (e.g., we will often write HA instead of H(5)A). If time
speiations are omitted, we assume the transfers happen at the optimal times,
4
i.e.,
the times that lead to highest expeted utility. If we onsider strategies with the same
sequene of ations but dierent timings to be the same strategy, the agent has O(jEj
k
)
possible strategies to selet from, where k is the maximum length of the strategy and jEj
is the number of entities. Thus, the agent has a wide range of options, even if pratial
onsiderations lead to a reasonable upper bound on k and jEj. The agent must selet the
strategy that maximizes the overall expeted utility of .
In the rest of this setion, we present a mathematial model of transfer-of-ontrol strate-
gies for AA and use that model to guide the searh for a solution. Moreover, the model
provides a tool for prediting the performane of various strategies, justifying their use
and explaining observed phenomena of their use. Setion 3.1 presents the model of AA
strategies in detail. Setion 3.2 reveals key properties of omplex strategies, inluding dom-
inane relationships among strategies. Setion 3.3 examines the E-Elves appliation in the
light of the model, to make spei preditions about some properties that a suessful
AA approah reasoning for that appliation lass will have. These preditions shape the
operationalization of strategies in Setion 4.
3.1 A Mathematial Model of Strategies
The transfer-of-ontrol model presented in this setion allows alulation of the expeted
utility (EU) of individual strategies, thus allowing strategies to be ompared. The alu-
lation of a strategy's EU onsiders four elements: the likely relative quality of dierent
entities' deisions; the probability of getting a response from an entity at a partiular time;
the ost of delaying a deision; and the osts and benets of hanging oordination on-
straints. While other parameters might also be modeled in a similar manner, our experiene
with the E-Elves and other AA work suggests that these parameters are the ritial ones
aross a wide range of joint ativities.
The rst element of the model is the expeted quality of an entity's deision. In general,
we apture the quality of an entity's deision at time t with the funtions EQ = fEQ
d
e
(t) :
R! Rg. The quality of a deision reets both the probability that the entity will make an
\appropriate" deision and the osts inurred if the deision is wrong. The expeted quality
of a deision is alulated in a deision theoreti way, by multiplying the probability of eah
outome, i.e., eah deision, by the utility of that deision, i.e., the ost or benet of that
deision. For example, the higher the probability that the entity will make a mistake, the
lower the quality, even lower if the mistakes might be very ostly. The quality of deision
an entity will make an vary over time as the information available to it hanges or as it has
more time to \think". The seond element of the model is the probability that an entity
will make a deision if ontrol is transferred to it. The funtions, P = fP
e
>
(t) : R! [0; 1℄g,
represent ontinuous probability distributions over the time that the entity e will respond.
That is, the probability that e
i
will respond before time t
0
is
R
t
0
0
P
e
i
>
(t)dt.
The third element of the model is a representation of the ost of inappropriate timing
of a deision. In general, not making a deision until a partiular point in time inurs some
4. The best time to transfer ontrol an be found, e.g., by dierentiating the expeted utility equation in
Setion 3.1 and solving for 0.
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ost that is a funtion of both the time, t, and the oordination onstraints, , between
team members. As stated earlier, we fous on ases of onstraint violations due to delays
in making deisions. Thus, the ost is due to the violation of the onstraints aused by
not making a deision until that point in time. We an write down a wait-ost funtion:
W = f(; t) whih returns the ost of not making a deision until a partiular point in time
given oordination onstraints, . This misoordination ost is a fundamental aspet of our
model given our emphasis on multiagent domains. It is alled a \wait ost" beause it models
the misoordination that arises while the team \waits" for some entity to make the ultimate
deision. In domains like E-Elves, the team inurs suh wait osts in situations where (for
example) other meeting attendees have assembled in a meeting room at the time of the
meeting, but are kept waiting without any input or deision from Friday (potentially beause
it annot provide a high-quality deision, nor an it get any input from its user). Notie
that dierent roles will lead to dierent wait ost funtions, sine delays in the performane
of dierent roles will have dierent eets on the team. We assume that there is some
point in time, , after whih no more osts arue, i.e., if t   then f(; t) = f(;).
At the deadline, , the maximum ost due to inappropriate timing of a deision has been
inurred. Finally, we assume that, in general, until , the wait ost funtion is non-
dereasing, reeting the idea that bigger violations of onstraints lead to higher wait osts.
The nal element of the model is the oordination-hange ation, D, whih moves the agent
further away from the deadline and hene redues the wait osts that are inurred. We
model the eet of the D by letting W be a funtion of t   D
value
(rather than t) after
the D ation and as having a xed ost, D
ost
, inurred immediately upon its exeution.
For example, in the E-Elves domain, suppose at the time of the meeting, Friday delays the
meeting by 15 minutes (D ation). Then, in the following time period, it will inur the
relatively low ost of not making a deision 15 minutes before the meeting (t   D
value
),
rather than the relatively high ost of not making the deision at the time of the meeting.
Other, possibly more omplex, models of a D ation ould also be used.
We use these four elements to ompute the EU of an arbitrary strategy, s. The utility
derived from a deision being made at time t by the entity in ontrol is the quality of the
entity's deision minus the osts inurred from waiting until t, i.e., EU
d
e

(t) = EQ
d
e

(t)  
W(t). If a oordination-hange ation has been taken it will also have an eet on utility.
Until a oordination hange of value D
value
is taken at some time , the inurred wait ost
isW(). Then, between  and t, the wait ost inurred isW(t D
value
) W( D
value
).
Thus, if a D ation has been taken at time  for ost D
ost
and with value D
value
, the
utility from a deision at time t (t > ) is: EU
d
e

(t) = EQ
d
e

(t) W() W( D
value
) +
W(t D
value
) D
ost
. To alulate the EU of an entire strategy, we multiply the response
probability mass funtion's value at eah instant by the EU of reeiving a response at that
instant, and then integrate over the produts. Hene, the EU for a strategy s given a
problem instane, hA;; ;; d; Ei, is:
EU
hA;;;;d;Ei
s
=
Z
1
0
P
>
(t)EU
d
e

(t) :dt (2)
If a strategy involves several ations, we need to ensure that the probability of response
funtion and the wait-ost alulation reet the ontrol situation at that point in the
strategy. For example, if the user, H, has ontrol at time t, P
>
(t) should reet H's
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EU
d
A
= EQ
d
A
(0)  W(0) (3)
EU
d
e
=
Z

0
P
>
(t) (EQ
d
e
(t) W(t)):dt +
Z
1

P
>
(t) (EQ
d
e
(t) W(D)):dt (4)
EU
d
eA
=
Z
T
0
P
>
(t) (EQ
d
e
(t) W(t)):dt +
Z
1
T
P
>
(t):dt (EQ
d
a
(T ) W(T )) (5)
EU
d
eDeA
= (6)
R

0
P
>
(t)(EQ
d
e
(t) W(t)):dt
0
+
R
T

P
>
(t)(EQ
d
e
(t) W() +W( D
value
) W(t D
value
) D
ost
):dt+
R
1
T
P
>
(t)(EQ
d
A
(t) W() +W( D
value
) W(T  D
value
) D
ost
):dt
Table 1: General AA EU equations for sample transfer of ontrol strategies.
probability of responding at t, i.e., P
H
>
(t
0
). To this end, we an break the integral from
Equation 2 into separate terms, with eah term representing one segment of the strategy,
e.g., for a strategy UA there would be one term for when U has ontrol and another for
when A has ontrol.
Using this basi tehnique for writing down EU alulations, we an write down the
spei equations for arbitrary transfer-of-ontrol strategies. Equations 3-6 in Table 1
show the EU equations for the strategies A, e, eA and eDeA respetively. The equations
assume that the agent, A, an make the deision instantaneously (or at least, with no delay
signiant enough to aet the overall value of the deision). The equations are reated by
writing down the integral for eah of the segments of the strategy, as desribed above. T
is the time when the agent takes ontrol from e, and  is the time at whih the D ours.
One an write down the equations for more omplex strategies in the same way. Notie
that these equations make no assumptions about the partiular funtions.
Given that the EU of a strategy an be alulated, the AA problem for the agent redues
to nding and following the transfer-of-ontrol strategy that will maximize its EU. Formally,
the agent's problem is:
Axiom 3.1 For a problem hA;; ;; d; Ei, the agent must selet s 2 S suh that 8s
0
2
S; s
0
6= s;EU
hA;;;;d;Ei
s
 EU
hA;;;;d;Ei
s
0
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Figure 3: Graph omparing the EU of two strategies, HDA (solid line) and H (dashed line)
given a partiular instantiation of the model with onstant expeted deision-
making quality, exponentially rising wait osts, and Markovian response proba-
bilities. p is a parameter to the P
>
(t) funtion, with higher p meaning longer
expeted response time. w is a parameter to the W(t) funtion with higher w
meaning more rapidly aruing wait osts.
3.2 Dominane Relationships among Strategies
An agent ould potentially nd the strategy with the highest EU by examining eah and
every strategy in S, omputing its EU, and seleting the strategy with the highest value. For
example, onsider the problem for domains with onstant expeted deision-making quality,
exponentially rising wait osts, and Markovian response probabilities. Figure 3 shows a
graph of the EU of two strategies (HDA and H) given this partiular model instantiation.
Notie that, for dierent response probabilities and rates of wait ost arual, one strategy
outperforms the other, but neither strategy is dominant over the entire parameter spae.
The EU of a strategy is also dependent on the timing of transfers of ontrol, whih in turn
depend on the relative quality of the entities' deision making. Appendix I provides a more
detailed analysis.
Fortunately, we do not have to evaluate and ompare eah and every andidate in an
exhaustive searh to nd the optimal strategy. We an instead use analytial methods
to draw general onlusions about the relative values of dierent andidate strategies. In
partiular, we present three Lemmas that show the domain-level onditions under whih
partiular strategy types are superior to others. The Lemmas also lead us to the, perhaps
surprising, onlusion that omplex strategies are not neessarily superior to single-shot
strategies, even in a multi-agent ontext; in fat, no partiular strategy dominates all other
strategies aross all domains.
Let us rst onsider the AA subproblem of whether an agent should ever take bak
ontrol from another entity. If we an show that, under ertain onditions, an agent should
always eventually take bak ontrol, then our strategy seletion proess an ignore any
strategies where the agent does not do so (i.e., any strategies not ending in A). The agent's
goal is to strike the right balane between not waiting indenitely for a user response and not
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taking a risky autonomous ation. Informally, the agent reasons that it should eventually
make a deision if the expeted ost of ontinued waiting exeeds the dierene between the
user's deision quality and its own. More formally, the agent should eventually take bak
deision-making ontrol i, for some time t:
Z

t
P
>
(t
0
)W(t
0
):dt
0
 W(t) > EQ
d
U
(t) EQ
d
A
(t) (7)
where the left-hand side alulates the future expeted wait osts and the right-hand side
alulates the extra utility to be gained by getting a response from the user. This result
leads to the following general onlusion about strategies that end with giving ontrol bak
to the agent:
Lemma 1: If s 2 S is a strategy ending with e 2 E, and s
0
is sA, then EU
d
s
0
> EU
d
s
i
8e 2 E;9t <  suh that
R

t
P
>
(t
0
)W(t
0
):dt
0
 W(t) > EQ
d
e
(t) EQ
d
A
(t)
Lemma 1 says that if, at any point in time, the expeted ost of indenitely leaving
ontrol in the hands of the user exeeds the dierene in quality between the agent's and
user's deisions, then strategies whih ultimately give the agent ontrol dominate those
whih do not. Thus, if the rate of wait ost arual inreases or the dierene in the
relative quality of the deision-making abilities dereases or the user's probability of response
dereases, then strategies where the agent eventually takes bak ontrol will dominate. A
key onsequene of the Lemma (in the opposite diretion) is that, if the rate that osts arue
does not aelerate, and if the probability of response stays onstant (i.e., Markovian), then
the agent should indenitely leave ontrol with the user (if the user had originally been
given ontrol), sine the expeted wait ost will not hange over time. Hene, even if the
agent is faed with a situation with potentially high total wait osts, the optimal strategy
may be a one-shot strategy of handing over ontrol and waiting indenitely, beause the
expeted future wait osts at eah point in time are relatively low. Thus, Lemma 1 isolates
the ondition under whih we should onsider appending an A transfer-of-ontrol ation to
our strategy.
We an perform a similar analysis to identify the onditions under whih we should
inlude a D ation in our strategy. The agent has inentive in hanging oordination
onstraints via a D ation due to the additional time made available for getting a high-
quality response from an entity. However, the overall value of a D ation depends on
a number of fators (e.g., the ost of taking the D ation and the timing of subsequent
transfers of ontrol). We an alulate the expeted value of a D by omparing the EU of a
strategy with and without a D. The D is useful if and only if the inreased expeted value
of the strategy with it is greater than its ost, D
ost
.
Lemma 2: if s 2 S has no D and s
0
is s with a D inluded at t then EU
d
s
0
> EU
d
s
i
R
P
>
(t
0
)W(t):dt
0
 
R
P
>
(t
0
)W(tjD):dt
0
> D
ost
We an illustrate the onsequenes of Lemma 2 by onsidering the spei problemmodel
of Appendix I (i.e., P
>
(t) =  exp
 t
,W(t) = ! exp
!t
, EQ
d
e
(t) = , and andidate strategies
eA and eDA). In this ase, EU
d
eDA
> EU
d
eA
i  (  !)! exp
 ( !)
(1  exp
 !D
value
) >
D
ost
. Figure 4 plots the value of the D ation as we vary the rate of wait ost aumulation,
w, and the parameter of the Markovian response probability funtion, p. The graph shows
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Figure 4: The value of D ation in a partiular model (P
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that the benet from the D is highest when the probability of response is neither too low
nor too high. When the probability of response is low, the user is unlikely to respond,
even given the extra time; hene, the agent will have inurred D
ost
with no benet. A
D also has little value when the probability of response is high, beause the user will likely
respond shortly after the D, meaning that it has little eet (the eet of the D is on the
wait osts after the ation is taken). Overall, aording to Lemma 2, at those points where
the graph goes above D
ost
, the agent should inlude a D ation, and, at all other points, it
should not. Figure 4 demonstrates the value of a D ation for a spei sublass of problem
domains, but we an extend our onlusion to the more general ase as well. For instane,
while the spei model has exponential wait osts, in models where wait osts grow more
slowly, there will be fewer situations where Lemma 2's riterion holds (i.e., where a D will
be useful). Thus, Lemma 2 allows us to again eliminate strategies from onsideration, based
on the evaluation of its riterion in the partiular domain of interest.
Given Lemma 2's evaluation of adding a single D ation to a strategy, it is natural to
ask whether a seond, third, et. D ation would inrease EU even further. In other words,
when a omplex strategy is better than a simple one, is an even more omplex strategy even
better? The answer is \not neessarily".
Lemma 3: 8K 2 N;9W 2 W; 9P 2 P; 9EQ 2 EQ suh that the optimal strategy
has K D ations.
Informally, Lemma 3 says that we annot x a single, optimal number of D ations,
beause for every possible number of D ations, there is a potential domain (i.e., ombination
of a wait-ost, response-probability, and expeted-quality funtions) for whih that number
of D ations is justied by being optimal. Consider a situation where the ost of a D was
a funtion of the number of Ds to date (i.e., the ost of the Kth D is f(K)). For example,
in the E-Elves' meeting ase, the ost of delaying a meeting for the third time is muh
higher than the ost of the rst delay, sine eah delay is suessively more annoying to
other meeting partiipants. Hene, the test for the usefulness of the Kth D in a strategy,
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given the spei model in Appendix I, is:
f(K) < !(exp
 D
value
!
 1) (

Æ
exp
 ÆT
 
!
Æ
exp
 Æ
  exp
! T
) (8)
Depending on the nature of f(K), Equation 8 an hold for any number of Ds, so, for any
K, there will be some onditions for whih a strategy with K Ds is optimal. For instane,
in Setion 5.3, we show that the maximum length of the optimal strategy for a random
onguration of up to 25 entities is usually less than eight ations.
Equation 8 illustrates how the value of an additionalD an be limited by hanging D
ost
,
but Lemma 3 also shows us that other fators an aet the value of an additional D. For
example, even with a onstant D
ost
, the value of an additional D depends on how many
other D ations the agent performs. Figure 4 shows that the value of the D depends on the
rate at whih wait osts arue. If the rate of wait ost arual aelerates over time (e.g.,
for the exponential model), a D ation slows that aeleration, rendering a seond D ation
less useful (sine the wait osts are now aruing more slowly). Notie also that Ds beome
valueless after the deadline, when wait osts stop aruing.
Taken together, Lemmas 1-3 show that no partiular transfer-of-ontrol strategy dom-
inates all others aross all domains. Moreover, very dierent strategies, from single-shot
strategies to arbitrarily omplex strategies, are appropriate for dierent situations, although
the range of situations where a partiular transfer-of-ontrol ation provides benet an be
quite narrow. Sine a strategy might have very low EU for some set of parameters, hoosing
the wrong strategy an lead to very poor results. On the other hand, one we understand
the parameter onguration of an intended appliation domain, Lemmas 1-3 provide useful
tools for fousing the searh for an optimal transfer-of-ontrol strategy. The Lemmas an
be used o-line to substantially redue the spae of strategies that need to be searhed to
nd the optimal strategy. However, in general there may be many strategies and nding
the optimal strategy may not be possible or feasible.
3.3 Model Preditions for the E-Elves
In this setion, we use the model to predit properties of a suessful approah to AA in
the E-Elves. Using approximate funtions for the probability of response, wait ost, and
expeted deision quality, we an alulate the EU of various strategies and determine the
types of strategies that are going to be useful. Armed with this knowledge, we an predit
some key properties of a suessful implementation.
A key feature of the E-Elves is that the user is mobile. As she moves around the environ-
ment, her probability of responding to requests for deisions hanges drastially, e.g., she is
most likely to respond when at her workstation. To alulate the EU of dierent strategies,
we need to know P
>
(t), whih means that we need to estimate the response probabilities
and model how they hange as the user moves around. When Friday ommuniates via a
workstation dialog box, the user will respond, on average, in ve minutes. However, when
Friday ommuniates via a Palm pilot the average user response time is an hour. Users
generally take longer to deide whether they want to present at a researh meeting, taking
approximately two days on average. So, the funtion P
>
(t) should have an average value
of 5 minutes when the user in her oÆe, an average of one hour when the user is ontated
via a Palm pilot and an average of two days when the deision is whether to present at a
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researh meeting. It is also neessary to estimate the relative quality of the user, EQ
d
U
(t),
and Friday's deision making, EQ
d
A
(t). We assume that the user's deision-making EQ
d
U
(t)
is high with respet to Friday's, EQ
d
A
(t). The unertainty about user intentions makes it
very hard for Friday to onsistently make orret deisions about the time at whih the user
will arrive at meetings, although its sensors (e.g., GPS devie) give some indiation of the
user's loation. When dealing with more important meetings, the ost of Friday's errors
is higher. Thus, in some ases, the deision-making quality of the user and Friday will be
similar, i.e., EQ
U
d
(t)  EQ
A
d
(t); while in other ases, there will be an order of magnitude
dierene, i.e., EQ
U
d
(t)  10EQ
A
d
(t). The wait ost funtion,W(t), will be muh larger for
big meetings than small and inrease rapidly as other attendees wait longer in the meeting
room. Finally, the ost of delays, i.e., D
ost
, an vary by about an order of magnitude. In
partiular, the ost of resheduling meetings varies greatly, e.g., the ost of resheduling
small informal meetings with olleagues is far less than resheduling a full leture room at
5 PM Friday.
The parameters laid out above show how parameters vary from deision to deision. For
a spei deision, we use Markovian response probabilities (e.g., when the user is in her
oÆe, the average response time is ve minutes), exponentially inreasing wait osts, and
onstant deision-making quality (though it hanges from deision to deision) to alulate
the EU of interesting strategies. Calulating the EU of dierent strategies using the values
for dierent parameters shown above allows us to draw the following onlusions (Table 5
in Setion 5.3 presents a quantitative illustration of these preditions):
 The strategy e should not be used, sine for all ombinations of user loation and
meeting importane the EU of this strategy is very low.
 Multiple strategies are required, sine for dierent user loations and meeting impor-
tane dierent strategies are optimal.
 Sine quite dierent strategies are required when the user is in dierent loations, the
AA reasoning will need to hange strategies when the user hanges loation.
 No strategy has a reasonable EU for all possible parameter instantiations, hene always
using the same strategy will oasionally ause dramati failures.
 For most deisions, strategies will end with the agent taking a deision, sine strategies
ending with the user in ontrol generally have very low EU.
These preditions provide important guidane about a suessful solution for AA in the
E-Elves. In partiular, they make lear that the approah must exibly hoose between
dierent strategies and adjust depending on the meeting type and user loation.
Setion 2.2 desribed the unsuessful C4.5 approah to AA in E-Elves and identied
several reasons for the mistakes that ourred. In partiular, rigidly transferring ontrol to
one entity and ignoring potential team osts involved in an agent's deision were highlighted
as reasons for the dramati mistakes in Friday's autonomy reasoning. Reviewing the C4.5
approah in the light of the notion of strategies, we see that Friday learned one strategy and
stuk with that strategy. In partiular, originally, Friday would wait indenitely for a user
response, i.e., it would follow strategy e, if it had learned to transfer ontrol. As shown later
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in Table 5, this strategy has a very low EU. When a xed-length timeout was introdued,
Friday would follow strategy e(5)A. Suh a strategy has high EU when EQ
U
d
(t)  EQ
A
d
(t)
but very low EU when EQ
U
d
(t)  10  EQ
A
d
(t). Thus, the model explains a phenomenon
observed in pratie.
On the other hand, we an use the model to understand that C4.5's failure in this ase
does not mean that it will never be useful for AA. Dierent strategies are only required
when ertain parameters (like probability of response or wait ost) hange signiantly. In
appliations where suh parameters do not hange dramatially from deision to deision,
one partiular strategy may always be appropriate. For suh appliations, C4.5 might learn
the right strategy just with a small amount of training data and perform aeptably well.
4. Operationalizing Strategies with MDPs
We have formalized the problem of AA as the seletion of the transfer-of-ontrol strat-
egy with the highest EU. We now need an operational mehanism that allows an agent to
perform that seletion. One major onlusion from the previous setion is that dierent
strategies dominate in dierent situations, and that appliations suh as E-Elves will re-
quire mehanism(s) for seleting strategies in a situation-sensitive fashion. In partiular,
the mehanism must exibly hange strategies as the situation hanges. The required meh-
anism must also represent the utility funtion speied by our expeted deision qualities,
EQ, the osts of violating oordination onstraints, W, and our oordination-hange ost,
D
ost
. Finally, the mehanism must also represent the unertainty of entity responses and
then look ahead over the possible responses (or lak thereof) that may our in the future.
MDPs are a natural means of performing the deision-theoreti planning required to nd
the best transfer-of-ontrol strategy. MDP poliies provide a mapping between the agent's
state and the optimal transfer of ontrol strategy. By enoding the parameters of the model
of AA strategies into the MDP, the MDP eetively beomes a detailed implementation of
the model and, hene, assumes its properties. We an use standard algorithms (Puterman,
1994) to nd the optimal MDP poliy and, hene, the optimal strategies to follow in eah
state.
To simplify exposition, as well as to illustrate the generality of the resulting MDP, this
setion desribes the mapping from AA strategies to the MDP in four subsetions. In
partiular, Setion 4.1 provides a diret mapping of strategies to an abstrat MDP. Setion
4.2 lls in state features to enable a more onrete realization of the reward funtion, while
still maintaining a domain-independent view. Thus, the setion ompletely denes a general
MDP for AA is potentially reusable aross a broad lass of domains. Setion 4.3 illustrates
an implemented instantiation of the MDP in E-Elves. Setion 4.4 addresses further pratial
issues in operationalizing suh MDPs in domains suh as E-Elves.
4.1 Abstrat MDP Representation of AA Problem
Our MDP representation's fundamental state features apture the state of ontrol:
 ontrolling-entity is the entity that urrently has deision-making ontrol.
 e
i
-response is any response e
i
has made to the agent's requests for input.
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Table 2: Transition probability funtion for AA MDP. e
trl
is the ontrolling-entity.
 time is the urrent time, typially disretized and ranging from 0 to our deadline,
 | i.e., a set ft
0
= 0; t
1
; t
2
; : : : ; t
n
= g.
If e
i
-response is not null or if time = , then the agent is in a terminal state. In the former
ase, the deision is the value of e
i
-response.
We an speify the set of ations for this MDP representation as   = E[fD;waitg. The
set of ations subsumes the set of entities, E, sine the agent an transfer deision-making
ontrol to any one of these entities. The D ation is the oordination-hange ation that
hanges oordination onstraints, as disussed earlier. The \wait" ation puts o transfer-
ring ontrol and making any autonomous deision, without hanging oordination with the
team. The agent should reason that \wait" is the best ation when, in time, the situation
is likely to hange to put the agent in a position for an improved autonomous deision or
transfer-of-ontrol, without signiant harm. For example, in the E-Elves domain, at times
loser to a meeting, users an generally make more aurate determinations about whether
they will arrive on time, hene it is sometimes useful to wait when the meeting is a long
time o.
The transition probabilities (speied in Table 2) represent the eets of the ations as
a distribution over their eets (i.e., the ensuing state of the world). If, in a state with
time = t
k
, the agent hooses an ation that transfers deision-making ontrol to an entity,
e
i
, other than the agent itself, the outome is a state with ontrolling-entity = e
i
and
time = t
k+1
. There are two possible outomes for e
i
-response: either the entity responds
with a deision during this transition (produing a terminal state), or it does not, and we
derive the probability distribution over the two from P. The \wait" ation has a similar
branh, exept that the ontrolling-entity remains unhanged. Finally, the D ation ours
instantaneously, so there is no time for the ontrolling entity to respond, but the resulting
state eetively moves to an earlier time (e.g., from t
k
to t
k
 D
value
).
We an derive the reward funtion for this MDP in a straightforward fashion from
our strategy model. Table 3 presents the omplete speiation of this reward funtion.
In transitions that take up time, i.e., transferring ontrol and not reeiving a response
(Table 3, row 1) or \wait" (Table 3, row 2), the agent inurs the wait ost of that interval.
In transitions where the agent performs D, the agent inurs the ost of that ation (Table 3,
row 3). In terminal states with a response from e
i
, the agent derives the expeted quality of
that entity's deision (Table 3, row 4). A poliy that maximizes the reward that an agent
expets to reeive aording to this AA MDP model will orrespond exatly to an optimal
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e
i
t
k
no D D
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e
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t
k
yes EQ
d
e
i
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k
)
Table 3: Reward funtion for AA MDP.
transfer-of-ontrol strategy. Note that this reward funtion is desribed in an abstrat
fashion|for example, it does not speify how to ompute the agent's expeted quality of
deision, EQ
A
d
(t).
4.2 MDP Representation of AA Problem within Team Context
We have now given a high-level desription of an MDP for implementing the notion of
transfer-of-ontrol strategies for AA. The remainder of this setion provides a more detailed
look at the MDP for a broad lass of AA domains (inluding the E-Elves) where the agent
ats on behalf of a user who is lling a role, , within the ontext of a team ativity, .
The reward funtion ompares the EU of dierent strategies, nding the optimal one for
the urrent state. To failitate this alulation, we need to represent the parameters used
in the model. We introdue the following state features to apture the aspets of the AA
problem in a team ontext:
 team-orig-expet- is what the team originally expeted of the fullling of .
 team-expet- is the team's urrent expetations of what fullling the role  implies.
 agent-expet- is the agent's (probabilisti) estimation for how  will be fullled.
 \other  attributes" enapsulate other aspets of the joint ativity that are aeted
by the deision.
When we add these more spei features to the generi AA state features already
presented, the overall state, within the MDP representation of a deision d, is a tuple:
hontrolling-entity; team-orig-expet-; team-expet-; agent-expet-; -status;
e
i
-response; time; other  attributesi
For example, for a meeting senario, team-orig-expet- ould be \Meet at 3pm", team-
expet- ould be \Meet at 3:15pm" after a user requested a delay, and agent-expet- ould
be \Meet at 3:30pm" if the agent believes its user will not make the resheduled meeting.
The transition probability funtion for the AA MDP in a team ontext inludes our
underlying AA transition probabilities from Table 3, but it must also inlude probabilities
over these new state features. In partiular, in addition to the temporal eet of the
D ation desribed in Setion 4.1, there is the additional eet on the oordination of .
The D ation hanges the value of the team-expet- feature (in a domain-dependent but
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deterministi way). No other ations aet the team's expetations. The team-orig-expet-
feature does not hange; we inlude it to simplify the denition of the reward funtion. The
transition probabilities over agent-expet- and other -spei features are domain-spei.
We provide an example of suh transition probabilities in Setion 4.3.
The nal part of the MDP representation is the reward funtion. Our team AA MDP
framework uses a reward funtion that breaks down the funtion from Table 3 as follows:
R(s; a) = f(team-orig-expet-(s); team-expet-(s); agent-expet-(s);
-status(s); time(s); a) (9)
=
X
e2EnfAg
EQ
d
e
(time(s))  e-response
 
1
f
1
(k team-orig-expet-(s)  team-expet-(s) k)
 
21
f
21
(time(s))
 
22
f
22
(k team-expet-(s)  agent-expet-(s) k)
+
3
f
3
(-status(s)) + 
4
f
4
(a)
(10)
The rst omponent of the reward funtion aptures the value of getting a response from
a deision-making entity other than the agent itself. Notie that only one entity will atually
respond, so only one e-response will be non-zero. This orresponds to the EQ
e
d
(t) funtion
used in the model and the bottom row of Table 3. The f
1
funtion reets the inherent
value of performing a role as the team originally expeted, hene deterring the agent from
taking ostly oordination hanges unless they an gain some indiret value from doing
so. This orresponds to D
ost
from the mathematial model and the third row of Table 3.
The f
21
orresponds to the seond row of Table 3, so it represents the wait ost funtion,
W(t), from the model. This omponent enourages the agent to keep other team members
informed of the role's status (e.g., by making a deision or taking an expliit D ation),
rather than ausing them to wait without information. Funtions f
22
and f
3
represent
the quality of the agent's deision, represented by Q
A
d
(t). The standard MDP algorithms
ompute an expetation over the agent's reward, and an expetation over this quality will
produe the desired EQ
A
d
(t) from the fourth row of Table 3. The rst quality funtion, f
22
,
reets the value of keeping the team's understanding of how the role will be performed in
aordane with how the agent expets the user to atually perform the role. The agent
reeives most reward when the role is performed exatly as the team expets, but beause of
the unertainty in the agent's expetation, errors are possible. f
22
represents the osts that
ome with suh errors. The seond quality omponent, f
3
, inuenes overall reward based
on the suessful ompletion of the joint ativity, whih enourages the agent to take ations
that maximize the likelihood that the joint ativity sueeds. The desire to have the joint
task sueed is impliit in the mathematial model but must be expliitly represented in the
MDP. The omponent, f
4
, augments the rst row from Table 3 to aount for additional
osts of transfer-of-ontrol ations. In partiular, f
4
an be broken down further as follows:
f
4
(a) =
(
q(e) if a 2 E
0 otherwise
(11)
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The funtion q(e) represents the ost of transferring ontrol to a partiular entity, e.g., the
ost of a WAP phone message to a user. Notie, that these detailed, domain-spei osts
do not appear diretly in the model.
Given the MDP's state spae, ations, transition probabilities, and reward funtion,
an agent an use value iteration to generate a poliy P :S!  that speies the optimal
ation in eah state (Puterman, 1994). The agent then exeutes the poliy by taking the
ation that the poliy ditates in eah and every state in whih it nds itself. A poliy
may inlude several transfers of ontrol and oordination-hange ations. The partiular
series of ations depends on the ativities of the user. We an then interpret this poliy as
a ontingent ombination of many transfer-of-ontrol strategies, with the strategy to follow
hosen depending on the user's status (i.e., agent-expet-).
4.3 Example: The E-Elves MDPs
An example of an AA MDP is the generi delay MDP, whih an be instantiated for any
meeting for whih Friday may at on behalf of its user. Reall the deision, d, is whether
to let other meeting attendees wait for a user or to begin their meeting. The joint ativity,
, is the meeting in whih the agent has the role, , of ensuring that its user attends the
meeting at the sheduled time. The oordination onstraints, , are that the attendees
arrive at the meeting loation simultaneously and the eet of the D ation is to delay or
anel the meeting.
In the delay MDP's state representation, team-orig-expet- is originally-sheduled-
meeting-time, sine attendane at the originally sheduled meeting time is what the team
originally expets of the user and is the best possible outome. team-expet- is time-
relative-to-meeting, whih may inrease if the meeting is delayed. -status beomes status-
of-meeting. agent-expet- is not represented expliitly; instead, user-loation is used as
an observable heuristi of when the user is likely to attend the meeting. For example, a
user who is away from the department shortly before a meeting should begin is unlikely to
be attending on time, if at all. With all the state features, the total state spae ontains
2800 states for eah individual meeting, with the large number of states arising from a very
ne-grained disretization of time.
The general reward funtion is mapped to the delay MDP reward funtion in the fol-
lowing way.
f
1
=
(
g(N;) if N < 4
1 otherwise
(12)
where N is the number of times the meeting is resheduled and g is a funtion that takes
into aount fators like the number of meeting attendees, the size of the meeting delay and
the time until the originally sheduled meeting time. This funtion eetively forbids the
agent from ever performing 4 or more D ations.
In the delay MDP, the funtions, f
21
and f
22
, both orrespond to the ost of making the
meeting attendees wait, so we an merge them into a single funtion, f
2
. We expet that
suh a onsolidation is possible in similar domains where the team's expetations relate to
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the temporal aspet of role performane.
f
2
=
(
h(late; ) if late > 0
0 otherwise
(13)
where late is the dierene between the sheduled meeting time and the time the user
arrives at the meeting room. late is probabilistially alulated by the MDP based on the
user's urrent loation and a model of the user's behavior.
f
3
=
8
>
<
>
:
r

+ r
user
if the user attends
r

if the meeting takes plae, but the user does not attend
0 otherwise
(14)
The value, r

, models the inherent value of , while the value r
user
models the user's
individual value to .
f
4
was given previously in Equation 11. The ost of ommuniating with the user
depends on the medium whih is used to ommuniate. For example, there is higher ost
to ommuniating via a WAP phone than via a workstation dialog box.
When the users are asked for input, it is assumed that, if they respond, their response
will be \orret", i.e., if a user says to delay the meeting by 15 minutes, we assume the
user will arrive on time for the re-sheduled meeting. If the user is asked while in front of
his/her workstation, a dialog like the one shown in Figure 5 is popped up, allowing the user
to selet the ation to be taken. The expeted quality of the agent's deision is alulated
by onsidering the agent's proposed deision and the possible outomes of that deision.
For example, if the agent proposes delaying the meeting by 15 minutes, the alulation of
the deision quality inludes the probability and benets that the user will atually arrive
15 minutes after the originally sheduled meeting time, the probability and osts that the
user arrives at the originally sheduled meeting time, et.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) Dialog box for delaying meetings. (b) A small portion of the delay MDP.
The delay MDP also represents probabilities that a hange in user loation (e.g., from
oÆe to meeting loation) will our in a given time interval. Figure 5(b) shows a portion
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of the state spae, showing only the user-response, and user loation features. A transition
labeled \delay n" orresponds to the ation \delay by n minutes". The gure also shows
multiple transitions due to \ask" (i.e., transfer ontrol to the user) and \wait" ations, where
the relative probability of eah outome is represented by the thikness of the arrow. Other
state transitions orrespond to unertainty assoiated with a user's response (e.g., when the
agent performs the \ask" ation, the user may respond with spei information or may
not respond at all, leaving the agent to eetively \wait"). One possible poliy produed
by the delay MDP, for a sublass of meetings, speies \ask" in state S0 of Figure 5(b)
(i.e., the agent gives up some autonomy). If the world reahes state S3, the poliy speies
\wait". However, if the agent then reahes state S5, the poliy hooses \delay 15", whih
the agent then exeutes autonomously. In terms of strategies, this sequene of ations is
HD.
Earlier, we desribed another AA deision in the E-Elves, namely whether to lose an
aution for an open team role. Here, we briey desribe the key aspets of the mapping
of that deision to the MDP. The aution must be losed in time for the user to prepare
for the meeting, but with suÆient time given for interested users to submit bids and for
the human team leader to hoose a partiular user. team-orig-expet-(s) is that a high-
quality presenter be seleted with enough time to prepare. There is no D ation, hene
team-expet-(s) = team-orig-expet-(s). agent-expet-(s) is whether the agent believes it
has a high-quality bid or believes suh a bid will arrive in time for that user to be alloated
to the role. The agent's deision quality, EQ
d
A
(t), is a funtion of the number of bids that
have been submitted and the quality of those bids, e.g., if all team members have submitted
bids and one user's bid stands out, the agent an ondently hoose that user to do the
presentation. Thus, -status is primarily the quality of the best bid so far and the dierene
between the quality of that bid and the seond-best bid. The most ritial omponent of
the reward funtion from Equation 10 is the 
2
omponent, whih gives reward if the agent
fullls the users' expetation of having a willing presenter do a high-quality presentation.
4.4 User-Speied Constraints
The standard MDP algorithms provide the agent with optimal poliies subjet to the en-
oded probabilities and reward funtion. Thus, if the agent designer has aess to orret
models of the entities' (e.g., human users in the E-Elves) deision qualities and probabil-
ities of response, then the agent will selet the best possible transfer-of-ontrol strategy.
However, it is possible that the entities themselves have more aurate information about
their own abilities than does the agent designer. To exploit this knowledge, an entity ould
ommuniate its model of its quality of deision and probability of response diretly to
the agent designer. Unfortunately, the typial entity is unlikely to be able to express its
knowledge in the form of our MDP reward funtion and transition probabilities. An agent
ould potentially learn this additional knowledge on its own through its interations with
the entities in the domain. However, learning may require an arbitrarily large number of
suh interations, all of whih will take plae without the benet of the entities' inside
knowledge.
As an alternative, we an provide a language of onstraints that allows the entities to
diretly and immediately ommuniate their inside information to the agent. Our onstraint
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Figure 6: Sreenshot of the tool for entering onstraints. The onstraint displayed forbids
not transferring ontrol (i.e., fores transfer) ve minutes before the meeting if the
teammates have previously been given information about the user's attendane
at the meeting.
language provides the entities a simple way to inform the agent of their spei properties
and needs. An entity an use a onstraint to forbid the agent from entering spei states or
performing spei ations in spei states. Suh onstraints an be diretly ommuniated
by a user via the tool shown in Figure 6. For instane, in the gure shown the user is
forbidding the agent from autonomous ation ve minutes before the meeting. We dene
suh forbidden-ation onstraints to be a set, C
fa
, where eah element onstraint is a
boolean funtion, 
fa
:S A!ft; fg. Similarly, we dene forbidden-state onstraints to
be a set, C
fs
, with elements, 
fs
:S!ft; fg. If a onstraint returns t for a partiular domain
element (either state or state-ation pair, as appropriate), then the onstraint applies to the
given element. For example, a forbidden-ation onstraint, 
fa
, forbids the ation a from
being performed in state s if and only if 
fa
(s; a) = t.
To provide probabilisti semantis, suitable for an MDP ontext, we rst provide some
notation. Denote the probability that the agent will ever arrive in state s
f
after following
a poliy, P , from an initial state s
i
as Pr(s
i

!s
f
jP ). Then, we dene the semantis of
a forbidden-state onstraint 
fs
as requiring Pr(s
i

!s
f
jP ) = 0. The semantis given to a
forbidden-ation onstraint, 
fa
, is a bit more omplex, requiring Pr(s
i

!s
f
^P (s
f
)=ajP ) = 0
(i.e., 
fa
forbids the agent from entering state s
f
and then performing ation a). In some
ases, an aggregation of onstraints may forbid all ations in state s
f
. In this ase, the
onjuntion allows the agent to still satisfy all forbidden-ation onstraints by avoiding s
f
(i.e., the state s
f
itself beomes forbidden). One a state, s
f
, beomes indiretly forbidden
in this fashion, any ation that potentially leads the agent from an anestor state into
s
f
likewise beomes forbidden. Hene, the eet of forbidding onstraints an propagate
bakward through the state spae, aeting state/ation pairs beyond those whih ause
immediate violations.
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The forbidding onstraints are powerful enough for the entity to ommuniate a wide
range of knowledge about their deision quality and probability of response to the agent.
For instane, some E-Elves users have forbidden their agents from resheduling meetings
to lunh time. To do so, the users provide a feature speiation of the states they want
to forbid, suh as meeting-time=12 PM. Suh a speiation generates a forbidden-state
onstraint, 
fs
, that is true in any state, s, where meeting-time=12 PM in s. This onstraint
eetively forbids the agent from performing any D ation that would result in a state where
meeting-time=12PM. Similarly, some users have forbidden autonomous ations in ertain
states by providing a speiation of the ations they want to forbid, e.g., ation 6=\ask".
This generates a forbidden-ation onstraint, 
fa
, that is true for any state/ation pair,
(s; a), with a 6=\ask". For example, a user might speify suh a onstraint for states
where they are in their oÆe, at the time of a meeting beause they know that they will
always make deisions in that ase. Users an easily reate more ompliated onstraints
by speifying values for multiple features, as well as by using omparison funtions other
than = (e.g., 6=, >).
Analogous to the forbidding onstraints, we also introdue required-state and required-
ation onstraints, dened as sets, C
rs
and C
ra
, respetively. The interpretation provided
to the required-state onstraint is symmetri, but opposite to that of the forbidden-state
onstraint: Pr(s
i

!s
f
jP ) = 1. Thus, from any state, the agent must eventually reah a
required state, s
f
. Similarly, for the required-ation onstraint, Pr(s
i

!s
f
^P (s
f
)=ajP ) = 1.
The users speify suh onstraints as they do for their forbidding ounterparts (i.e., by spe-
ifying the values of the relevant state features or ation, as appropriate). In addition, the
requiring onstraints also propagate bakward. Informally, the forbidden onstraints fous
loally on spei states or ations, while the required onstraints express global properties
over all states.
The resulting language allows the agent to exploit synergisti interations between its
initial model of transfer-of-ontrol strategies and entity-speied onstraints. For example,
a forbidden-ation onstraint that prevents the agent from taking autonomous ation in a
partiular state is equivalent to the user speifying that the agent must transfer ontrol to
the user in that state. In AA terms, the user instruts the agent not to onsider any transfer-
of-ontrol strategies that violate this onstraint. To exploit this pruning of the strategy
spae by the user, we have extended standard value iteration to also onsider onstraint
satisfation when generating optimal strategies. Appendix II provides a desription of a
novel algorithm that nds optimal poliies while respeting user onstraints. The appendix
also inludes a proof of the algorithm's orretness.
5. Experimental Results
This setion presents experimental results aimed at validating the laims made in the previ-
ous setions. In partiular, the experiments aim to show the utility of omplex transfer-of-
ontrol strategies and the eetiveness of MDPs as a tehnique for their operationalization.
Setion 5.1 details the use of the E-Elves in daily ativities and Setion 5.2 disusses the
pros and ons of living and working with the assistane of Fridays. Setion 5.3 shows some
harateristis of strategies in this type of domain (in partiular, that dierent strategies
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are used in pratie). Finally, Setion 5.4 desribes detailed experiments that illustrate
harateristis of the AA MDP.
5.1 The E-Elves in Daily Use
The E-Elves system was heavily used by ten users in a researh group at ISI, between June
2000 and Deember 2000.
5
The Friday agents ran ontinuously, around the lok, seven
days a week. The exat number of agents running varied over the period of exeution, with
usually ve to ten Friday agents for individual users, a apability mather (with proxy),
and an interest mather (with proxy). Oasionally, temporary Friday agents operated on
behalf of speial guests or other short-term visitors.
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Figure 7: Number of daily oordination messages exhanged by proxies over a seven-month
period.
Figure 7 plots the number of daily messages exhanged by the Fridays over seven months
(June through Deember, 2000). The size of the daily ounts reets the large amount of
oordination neessary to manage various ativities, while the high variability illustrates
the dynami nature of the domain (note the low periods during vaations and nal exams).
Figure 8(a) illustrates the number of meetings monitored for eah user. Over the seven
months, nearly 700 meetings where monitored. Some users had fewer than 20 meetings,
while others had over 250. Most users had about 50% of their meetings delayed (this inludes
regularly sheduled meetings that were anelled, for instane due to travel). Figure 8(b)
shows that usually 50% or more of delayed meetings were autonomously delayed. In this
graph, repeated delays of a single meeting are ounted only one. The graphs show that the
5. The user base of the system was greatly redued after this period due to personnel reloations and
student graduations, but it remains in use with a smaller number of users.
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Figure 8: (a) Monitored vs. delayed meetings per user. (b) Meetings delayed autonomously
vs. by hand.
agents are ating autonomously in a large number of instanes, but, equally importantly,
humans are also often intervening, indiating the ritial importane of adjustable autonomy
in Friday agents.
For a seven-month period, the presenter for USC/ISI's TEAMCORE researh group
presentations was deided using autions. Table 4 shows a summary of the aution results.
Column 1 (\Date") shows the dates of the researh presentations. Column 2 (\No. of
Bids") shows the total number of bids reeived before a deision. A key feature is that
aution deisions were made without all 9 users entering bids; in fat, in one ase, only
4 bids were reeived. Column 3 (\Best bid") shows the winning bid. A winner typially
bid < 1; 1 >, i.e., indiating that the user it represents is both apable and willing to
do the presentation | a high-quality bid. Interestingly, the winner on July 27 made a
bid of < 0; 1 >, i.e., not apable but willing. The team was able to settle on a winner
despite the bid not being the highest possible, illustrating its exibility. Finally, olumns
4 (\Winner") and 5 (\Method") show the aution outome. An `H' in olumn 5 indiates
the aution was deided by a human, an `A' indiates it was deided autonomously. In ve
of the seven autions, a user was automatially seleted to be presenter. The two manual
assignments were due to exeptional irumstanes in the group (e.g., a rst-time visitor),
again illustrating the need for AA.
Date No. of bids Best bid Winner Method
Jul 6, 2001 7 1,1 Serri H
Jul 20, 2001 9 1,1 Serri A
Jul 27, 2001 7 0,1 Kulkarni A
Aug 3, 2001 8 1,1 Nair A
Aug 3, 2001 4 1,1 Tambe A
Sept 19, 2001 6 -,- Visitor H
Ot 31, 2001 7 1,1 Tambe A
Table 4: Results for autioning researh presentation slot.
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5.2 Evaluating the Pros and Cons of E-Elves Use
The general eetiveness of the E-Elves is shown by several observations. During the
E-Elves' operation, the group members exhanged very few email messages to announe
meeting delays. Instead, Fridays autonomously informed users of delays, thus reduing the
overhead of waiting for delayed members. Seond, the overhead of sending emails to reruit
and announe a presenter for researh meetings was assumed by agent-run autions. Third,
a web page, where Friday agents post their users' loation, was ommonly used to avoid
the overhead of trying to trak users down manually. Fourth, mobile devies kept users
informed remotely of hanges in their shedules, while also enabling them to remotely delay
meetings, volunteer for presentations, order meals, et. Users began relying on Friday so
heavily to order lunh that one loal \Subway" restaurant owner even suggested: \. . .more
and more omputers are getting to order food. . . so we might have to think about marketing
to them!!". Notie that this daily use of the E-Elves by a number of dierent users ourred
only after the MDP implementation of AA replaed the unreliable C4.5 implementation.
However, while the agents ensured that users spent less time on daily oordination (and
misoordination), there was a prie to be paid. One issue was that users felt they had
less privay when their loation was ontinually posted on the web and monitored by their
agent. Another issue was the seurity of private information suh as redit ard numbers
used for ordering lunh. As users adjusted to having agents monitor their daily ativities,
some users adjusted their own behavior around that of the agent. One example of suh
behavior was some users preferring to be a minute or two early for a meeting lest their
agent deide they were late and delay the meeting. In general, sine the agents never made
atastrophially bad deisions most users felt omfortable using their agent and frequently
took advantage of its servies.
The most emphati evidene of the suess of the MDP approah is that, sine replaing
the C4.5 implementation, the agents have never repeated any of the atastrophi mistakes
enumerated in Setion 2.2. In partiular, Friday avoids errors suh as error 3 from Setion
2.2 by seleting a strategy with a single, large D ation, beause it has a higher EU than a
strategy with many small Ds (e.g., DDDD). Friday avoids error 1, beause the large ost
assoiated with an erroneous anel ation signiantly penalizes the EU of a anellation.
Friday instead hooses the higher-EU strategy that rst transfers ontrol to a user before
taking suh an ation autonomously. Friday avoids errors suh as errors 2 and 4 by seleting
strategies in a situation-sensitive manner. For instane, if the agent's deision-making
quality is low (i.e., high risk), then the agent an perform a oordination-hange ation to
allow more time for user response or for the agent itself to get more information. In other
words, it exibly uses strategies like eDeA, rather than always using the e(5)A strategy
disussed in Setion 2.2. This indiates that a reasonably appropriate strategy was hosen
in eah situation. Although the urrent agents do oasionally make mistakes, these errors
are typially on the order of transferring ontrol to the user a few minutes earlier than may
be neessary. Thus, the agents' deisions have been reasonable, though not always optimal.
6
6. The inherent subjetivity in user feedbak makes a determination of optimality diÆult.
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5.3 Strategy Evaluation
The previous setion looked at the appliation of the MDP approah to the E-Elves but did
not address strategies in partiular. In this setion, we speially examine strategies in the
E-Elves. We show that Fridays did indeed follow strategies and that the strategies followed
were the ones predited by the model. We also show how the model led to an insight that,
in turn, led to a dramati simpliation in one part of the implementation. Finally, we show
that the use of strategies is not limited to the E-Elves appliation by showing empirially
that, for random ongurations of entities, the optimal strategy will have more than one
transfer-of-ontrol ation in 70% of ases.
Figure 9 shows a frequeny distribution of the number of ations taken per meeting
(this graph omits \wait" ations). The number of ations taken for a meeting orresponds
to the length of the part of the strategy followed (the strategy may have been longer, but
a deision was made so the ations were not taken). The graph shows both that the MDP
followed omplex strategies in the real world and that it followed dierent strategies at
dierent times. The graph bears out the model's preditions that dierent strategies would
be required of a good solution to the AA problem in the E-Elves domain.
Table 5 shows the EU values omputed by the model and the strategy seleted by
the MDP. Reall that the MDP expliitly models the users' movements between loations,
while the model assumes that the users do not move. Hene, in order to do an aurate
omparison between the model and the MDP's results, we fous on only those ases when
the user's loation does not hange (i.e., where the probability of response is onstant).
These EU values were alulated using the parameter values set out in Setion 3.3. Notie,
that the MDP will often perform Ds before transferring ontrol to buy time to redue
unertainty. The model is an abstration of the domain, so suh D ations, like hanges
in user loation, are not aptured. Exept for a slight disrepany in the rst ase the
math between the MDP's behavior and the model's preditions is exat, provided that we
ignore the D ations at the beginning of some MDP strategies. Thus, despite the model
being onsiderably abstrated from the domain there is high orrelation between the MDP
poliies and the model's suggested strategies. Moreover, general properties of the poliies
that were predited by the model were borne out exatly. In partiular, reall that the model
predited dierent strategies would be required, that strategy e would not be used, and that
generally strategies ending in A would be best | all properties of the MDP poliies.
The model predits that if parameters do not vary greatly then it is suÆient to nd
a single optimal strategy and follow that strategy in eah situation. The MDP for the
deision to lose an aution is an instane of this for the E-Elves. The same pattern of
behavior is followed every time an open role needs to be lled by the team. This onsisteny
arises beause the wait ost is the same (sine the meetings are the same) and beause
the pattern of inoming bids is reasonably onsistent (variations in individuals' behavior
anel eah other out when we look at the team as a whole). The model predits that
when parameters do not hange, we an nd the optimal strategy for those parameters
and exeute that strategy every time. However, sine the MDP had worked eetively for
the meeting AA, an MDP was also hosen for implementing the aution AA. When it was
realized that the parameters do not vary greatly, we onluded the MDP ould be replaed
with a simple implementation of the optimal strategy. To verify this hypothesis, we replaed
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Figure 9: The frequeny distribution of the number of steps taken in an AA strategy for
the meeting senario. If no ations were taken for a meeting, the meeting was
anelled before Friday started AA reasoning.
Loation A e eA eDA MDP
Small meeting, ative partiipant
oÆe 14.8 -277 41.9 42.05 DDeDA
not  dept. 14.8 -6E7 31.4 28.0 DDeA
 meet lo. 14.8 -2E5 39.2 39.1 eA
Large meeting, passive partiipant
oÆe 14.6 -7E12 30.74 30.65 DDeA
not  dept. 14.6 -2E17 14.6 7.7 DDeA
 meet lo. 14.5 -7E14 25.1 23.5 eA
Table 5: EU values for the simple strategies as alulated from the model. The last olumn
shows the strategy atually followed by the MDP.
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Date No. Bids MDP eA
7/20/00 9 25% 26%
7/27/00 7 14% 20%
8/3/00 8 29% 23%
Table 6: Aution results. The \MDP" olumn shows the perentage of available aution
time remaining when the MDP hose to lose the aution. The \eA" olumn
shows the perentage of available aution time remaining when the strategy eA,
with EQ
d
e
(t) proportional to the number of bids reeived (\No. Bids" olumn),
would have losed the aution.
the general MDP ode with three simple lines of ode implementing the eA strategy, whih
we determined to be optimal for the partiular parameters of the problem. Using log les
reorded during the atual autions reported in (Serri, Pynadath, & Tambe, 2001), we
experimentally veried that both the MDP and the eA strategy produed the same result.
Table 6 shows the perentage of available aution time remaining (e.g., if the aution was
opened four days before the role should be performed, losing the aution one day before
would orrespond to 25%) when the MDP version and the eA version of the ode losed
the aution. The number of bids is used to estimate the agent's expeted deision quality.
The timing of the aution losing is lose, ertainly within just a few hours. The result
is not preisely the same for the MDP and strategy implementations, beause the MDP
implementation was more reative to inoming bids than the strategy implementation.
To onrm that the need for strategies was not a phenomenon unique to the partiular
settings of the E-Elves, an experiment was run with randomly generated ongurations
of entities. The wait ost for eah onguration inreased exponentially, with the rate of
arual varying from onguration to onguration. The ongurations ontained between
3 and 25 entities, with randomly hosen Markovian response probabilities and randomly
hosen, but onstant, deision-making quality. The ost and value of a D ation was also
randomly seleted. In eah onguration, there was an agent that ould respond instantly,
but with lower deision quality than any of the other entities. For eah onguration, the
optimal transfer-of-ontrol strategy was found. Figure 10(a) shows the perentage of optimal
strategies (z-axis) that were of eah length (y-axis \jOpt. Strat.j"), separated aording to
the rate at whih wait osts arued (x-axis, \Wait Cost Param"). The gure shows that
if the rate at whih the wait ost arues is very low, most optimal strategies are of length
one, with the agent just handing ontrol to the entity with the highest deision-making
quality. When the rate of wait ost arual is high, most strategies are of length two,
with the agent briey giving the best deision maker an opportunity to make the deision
but taking bak ontrol and ating before the wait osts beame too high. For intermediate
values of the wait ost parameter, there was onsiderably more variation in the length of the
optimal strategy. Figure 10(b) shows the perentage of optimal strategies for eah length
when the wait ost parameter is 0.12 (i.e., a slie through Figure 10(a)). Hene, strategies
often ontained several transfers of ontrol and several oordination hanges. Thus, this
experiment shows that omplex transfer-of-ontrol strategies are useful, not only in E-Elves,
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but in a range of domains, espeially those in whih wait osts are neither negligible nor
aruing too fast.
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Figure 10: (a) Perentage of optimal strategies having a ertain length, broken down a-
ording to how fast wait osts are aruing. (b) Perentage of optimal strategies
having ertain length for wait ost parameter = 0.12.
Thus, we have shown that the MDP produes strategies and that Friday follows these
strategies in pratie. Moreover, the strategies followed are the ones predited by the model.
Of pratial use, when we followed a predition of the model, i.e., that an MDP was not
required for autions, we were able to substantially redue the omplexity of one part of the
system. Finally, we showed that the need for strategies was not speially a phenomenon
of the E-Elves domain.
5.4 MDP Experiments
Experiene using the MDP approah to AA in the E-Elves indiates that it is eetive
at making reasonable AA deisions. However, in order to determine whether MDPs are
a generally useful tool for AA reasoning, more systemati experiments are required. In
this setion, we present suh systemati experiments to determine important properties of
MDPs for AA. The MDP reward funtion is designed to result in the optimal strategy being
followed in eah state.
In eah of the experiments, we vary one of the  parameters that are the weights of the
dierent fators in Equation 10. The MDP is instantiated with eah of a range of values
for the parameter and a poliy produed for eah value. In eah ase, the total poliy is
dened over 2800 states. The poliy is analyzed to determine some basi properties of that
poliy. In partiular, we ounted the number of states in whih the poliy speies to ask,
to delay, to say the user is attending and to say the user is not attending. The statistis
show broadly how the poliy hanges as the parameters hange, e.g., whether Friday gives
up autonomy more or less when the ost of a oordination hange is inreased. The rst
aim of the experiments is to simply onrm that poliies hange in the desired and expeted
way when parameters in the reward funtion are hanged. For instane, if Friday's expeted
deision quality is inreased, there should be more states where it makes an autonomous
205
Serri, Pynadath & Tambe
deision. Seondly, from a pratial perspetive it is ritial to understand how sensitive the
MDP poliies are to small variations in parameters, beause suh sensitivity would mean
that any small variations in parameter values an signiantly impat MDP performane.
Finally, the experiments reveal some interesting phenomena.
The rst experiment looks at the eet of the 
1
parameter from Equation 10, repre-
sented in the delay MDP implementation by the team repair ost (funtion g from Equation
12), on the poliies produed by the delay MDP. This parameter determines how averse Fri-
day should be to hanging oordination onstraints. Figure 11 shows how some properties
of the poliy hange as the team repair ost value is varied. The x-axis gives the value of
the team repair ost, and the y-axis gives the number of times that ation appears in the
poliy. Figure 11(a) shows the number of times Friday will ask the user for input. The
number of times it will transfer ontrol exhibits an interesting phenomenon: the number
of asks has a maximum at an intermediate value for the parameter. For the low values,
Friday an \ondently" (i.e., its deision quality is high) make deisions autonomously,
sine the ost of errors is low, hene there is less value to relinquishing autonomy. For
very high team repair osts, Friday an \ondently" deide autonomously not to make a
oordination hange. It is in the intermediate region that Friday is unertain and needs
to all on the user's deision making more often. Furthermore, as the ost of delaying the
meeting inreases, Friday will delay the meeting less (Figure 11(b)) and tell the team the
user is not attending more often (Figure 11(d)). By doing so, Friday gives the user less time
to arrive at the meeting, hoosing instead to just announe that the user is not attending.
Essentially, Friday's deision quality has beome lose enough to the user's deision quality
that asking the user is not worth the risk that they will not respond and the ost of asking
for their input. Exept for a jump between a value of zero and any non-zero value, the
number of times Friday says the user is attending does not hange (Figure 11()). The
delay MDP in use in the E-Elves has the team repair ost parameter set at two. Around
this value the poliy hanges little, hene slight hanges in the parameter do not lead to
large hanges in the poliy.
In the seond experiment, we vary the 
2
parameter from Equation 10, implemented
in the delay MDP by the variable team wait ost (funtion h from Equation 13). This is
the fator that determines how heavily Friday should weigh dierenes between how the
team expets the user will fulll the role and how the user will atually fulll the role. In
partiular, it determines the ost of having other team members wait in the meeting room
for the user. Figure 12 shows the hanges to the poliy when this parameter is varied (again
the x-axis shows the value of the parameter and the y-axis shows the number of times the
ation appears in the poliy). The graph of the number of times the agent asks in the
poliy (Figure 12(a)), exhibits the same phenomena as when the 
1
parameter was varied,
i.e., inreasing and then dereasing as the parameter inreases. The graphs show that, as
the ost of teammates' time inreases, Friday ats autonomously more often (Figure 12(b-
d)). Friday asks whenever the potential osts of asking are lower than the potential osts
of errors it makes { as the ost of time waiting for a user deision inreases, the balane
tips towards ating. Notie that the phenomenon of the number of asks inreasing then
dereasing ours in the same way that it did for the 
1
parameter; however, it ours for a
slightly dierent reason. In this ase, when waiting osts are low, Friday's deision-making
quality is high so it ats autonomously. When the waiting osts are high, Friday annot
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Figure 11: Properties of the MDP poliy as team repair ost is varied.
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aord the risk that the user will not respond quikly, so it again ats autonomously (despite
its deision quality being low). Figure 12(b) shows that the number of delay ations taken
by Friday inreases, but only in states in whih the meeting has already been delayed twie.
This indiates that the normally very expensive third delay of the same meeting starts to
beome worthwhile if the ost of having teammates wait in the meeting room is very high.
In the delay MDP, a value of 1 is used for 
2
. The deision to transfer ontrol (i.e., ask)
is not partiularly sensitive to hanges in the parameter around this value|again, slight
hanges will not have a signiant impat.
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Figure 12: Properties of the MDP poliy as teammate time ost is varied. (b) shows the
number of times the meeting is delayed in states where it has not yet been
delayed, where it has been delayed one already, and where it has been delayed
twie already.
In the third experiment, the value of the 
3
, the weight of the joint task, was varied
(Figure 13). In the E-Elves, the value of the joint task inludes the value of the user to the
meeting and the value of the meeting without the user. In this experiment, the value of the
208
Towards Adjustable Autonomy for the Real World
meeting without the user is varied. Figure 13 shows how the poliy hanges as the value of
the meeting without the user hanges (again the x-axis shows the value of the parameter
and the y-axis shows the number of times the ation appears in the poliy). These graphs
show signiantly more instability than for the other  values. These large hanges are a
result of the simultaneous hange in both the utility of taking key ations and the expeted
quality of Friday's deision making, e.g., the utility of saying the user is attending is muh
higher if the meeting has very low value without that user. In the urrent delay MDP, this
value is set at 0.25, whih is in a part of the graph that is very insensitive to small hanges
of the parameter.
In the three experiments above, the spei E-Elves parameters were in regions of the
graph where small hanges in the parameter do not lead to signiant hanges in the poliy.
However, there were regions of the graphs where the poliy did hange dramatially for small
hanges in a parameter. This indiates that in some domains, with parameters dierent to
those in E-Elves, the poliies will be sensitive to small hanges in the parameters.
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Figure 13: Properties of the MDP poliy as the importane of a suessful joint task is
varied.
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The above experiments show three important properties of the MDP approah to AA.
First, hanging the parameters of the reward funtion generally lead to the hanges in the
poliy that are expeted and desired. Seond, while the value of the parameters inuened
the poliy, the eet on the AA reasoning was often reasonably small, suggesting that small
errors in the model should not aet users too greatly. Finally, the interesting phenomena of
the number of asks reahing a peak at intermediate values of the parameters was revealed.
The three previous experiments have examined how the behavior of the MDP hanges
as the parameters of the reward funtion are hanged. In another experiment, a entral
domain-level parameter aeting the behavior of the MDP, i.e., the probability of getting a
user response and the ost of getting that response (orresponding to f
4
), is varied. Figure
14 shows how the number of times Friday hooses to ask (y-axis) varies with both the
expeted time to get a user response (x-axis) and the ost of doing so (eah line on the
graph represents a dierent ost). The MDP performs as expeted, hoosing to ask more
often if the ost of doing so is low and/or it is likely to get a prompt response. Notie
that, if the ost is low enough, Friday will sometimes hoose to ask the user even if there
is a long expeted response time. Conversely, if the expeted response time is suÆiently
high, Friday will assume omplete autonomy. This graph also shows that there is a distint
hange in the number of asks at some point (depending on the ost), but outside this hange
point the graphs are relatively at. The key reason for the fairly rapid hange in the number
of asks is that often the dierene between the quality of Friday's and the user's deision
making is in a fairly small range. As the mean response time inreases, the expeted wait
osts inrease, eventually beoming high enough for Friday to deide to at autonomously
instead of asking.
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Figure 14: Number of ask ations in poliy as the mean response time (in minutes) is varied.
The x-axis uses a logarithmi sale.
We onlude this setion with a quantitative illustration of the impat onstraints have
on strategy seletion. In this experiment, we merged user-speied onstraints from all the
E-Elves users, resulting in a set of 10 distint onstraints. We started with an unonstrained
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Figure 15: (a) Number of possible strategies (logarithmi). (b) Time required for strategy
generation.
instane of the delay MDP and added these onstraints one at a time, ounting the strategies
that satised the applied onstraints. We then repeated these experiments on expanded
instanes of the delay MDP, where we inreased the initial state spae by inreasing the
frequeny of deisions (i.e., adding values to the time-relative-to-meeting feature). This
expansion results in three new delay MDPs, whih are artiial, but are inuened by the
real delay MDP. Figure 15a displays these results (on a logarithmi sale), where line A
orresponds to the original delay MDP (2760 states), and lines B (3320 states), C (3880
states), and D (4400 states) orrespond to the expanded instanes. Eah data point is a
mean over ve dierent orderings of onstraint addition. For all four MDPs, the onstraints
substantially redue the spae of possible agent behaviors. For instane, in the original
delay MDP, applying all 10 onstraints eliminated 1180 of the 2760 original states from
onsideration, and redued the mean number of viable ations per aeptable state from
3.289 to 2.476. The end result is a 50% redution in the size (log
10
) of the strategy spae.
On the other hand, onstraints alone did not provide a omplete strategy, sine all of the
plots stay well above 0, even with all 10 onstraints. Sine none of the individual users were
able/willing to provide 10 onstraints, we annot expet anyone to add enough onstraints
to ompletely speify an entire strategy. Thus, the MDP representation and assoiated
poliy seletion algorithms are still far from redundant.
The onstraints' elimination of behaviors also dereases the time required for strategy
seletion. Figure 15b plots the total time for onstraint propagation and value iteration over
the same four MDPs as in Figure 15a (averaged over the same ve onstraint orderings).
Eah data point is also a mean over ve separate iterations, for a total of 25 iterations
per data point. The values for the zero-onstraint ase orrespond to standard value itera-
tion without onstraints. The savings in value iteration over the restrited strategy spae
dramatially outweigh the ost of pre-propagating the additional onstraints. In addition,
the savings inrease with the size of the MDP. For the original delay MDP (A), there is
a 28% redution in poliy-generation time, while for the largest MDP (D), there is a 53%
redution. Thus, the introdution of onstraints an provide dramati aeleration of the
agent's strategy seletion.
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6. Related Work
We have disussed some related work in Setion 1. This setion adds to that disussion.
In Setion 6.1, we examine two representative AA systems { where detailed experimental
results have been presented { and explain those results via our model. This illustrates the
potential appliability of our model to other systems. In Setion 6.2, we examine other AA
systems and other areas of related work, suh as meta-reasoning, onditional planning and
anytime algorithms.
6.1 Analyzing Other AA Work Using the Strategy Model
Goodrih, Olsen, Crandall, and Palmer (2001) report on tele-operated teams of robots,
where both the user's high-level reasoning and the robots' low-level skills are required to
ahieve some task. Within this domain, they have examined the eet of user neglet on
robot performane. The idea of user neglet is similar to our idea of entities taking time
to make deisions; in this ase, if the user \neglets" the robot, the joint task takes longer
to perform. In this domain, the oordination onstraint is that user input must arrive so
that the robot an work out the low-level ations it needs to perform. Four ontrol systems
were tested on the robot, eah giving a dierent amount of autonomy to the robot, and the
performane was measured as user neglet was varied.
Although quite distint from the E-Elves system, mapping Goodrih's team of robots
to our AA problem formulation provides some interesting insights. This system has the
interesting feature that the entity the robot an all on for a deision, i.e., the user, is also
part of the team. Changing the autonomy of the robot eetively hanges the nature of
the oordination onstraints between the user and robot. Figure 16 shows the performane
(y-axis) of the four ontrol poliies as the amount of user neglet was inreased (x-axis).
The experiments showed that higher robot autonomy allowed the operator to \neglet" the
robot more without as serious an impat on its performane.
The notion of transfer-of-ontrol strategies an be used to qualitatively predit the same
behavior as was observed in pratie, even though Goodrih et al. (2001) did not use the
notion of strategies. The lowest autonomy ontrol poliy used by Goodrih et al. (2001)
was a pure tele-operation one. Sine the robot annot resort to its own deision making,
we represent this ontrol poliy with a strategy U , i.e., ontrol indenitely in the hands
of the user. The seond ontrol poliy allows the user to speify waypoints and on-board
intelligene works out the details of getting to the waypoints. Sine the robot has no high-
level deision-making ability, the strategy is simply to give ontrol to the user. However,
sine the oordination between the robot and user is more abstrat, i.e., the oordination
onstraints are looser, the wait ost funtion is less severe. Also the human is giving less
detailed guidane than in the fully tele-operated ase (whih is not as good aording to
(Goodrih et al., 2001)), hene we use a lower value for the expeted quality of the user
deision. We denote this approah U
w
p to distinguish it from the fully tele-operated ase.
The next ontrol poliy allows the robot to hoose its own waypoints given that the user
inputs regions of interest. The robot an also aept waypoints from the user. The ability
for the robot to alulate waypoints is modeled as a D, sine it eetively hanges the
oordination between the entities, by removing the user's need to give waypoints. We model
this ontrol poliy as the strategy UDU . The nal ontrol poliy is full autonomy, i.e., A.
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Figure 16: Goodrih at al's various ontrol strategies plotted against neglet. (a) Experi-
mental results. Thinner lines represent ontrol systems with more intelligene
and autonomy. (b) Results theoretially derived from model of strategies pre-
sented in this artile (p is the parameter to the probability of response funtion).
Robot deision making is inferior to that of the user, hene the robot's deision quality is less
than the user's. The graphs of the four strategies, plotted against the probability of response
parameter (getting smaller to the right, to math \neglet" in the Goodrih et al graph) is
shown in Figure 16. Notie that the shape of the graph theoretially derived from our model,
shown in Figure 16(b), is qualitatively the same as the shape of the experimentally derived
graph, Figure 16(a). Hene, the theory predited qualitatively the same performane as
was found from experimentation.
A ommon assumption in earlier AA work has been that if any entity is asked for a
deision it will make that deision promptly, hene strategies handling the ontingeny
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of a lak of response have not been required. For example, Horvitz's (1999) work using
deision theory is aimed at developing general, theoretial models for AA reasoning for a
user at a workstation. A prototype system, alled LookOut, for helping users manage their
alendars has been implemented to test these ideas (Horvitz, 1999). Although suh systems
are distintly dierent from E-Elves, mapping them to our problem formulation allows us to
analyze the utility of the approahes aross a range of domains without having to implement
the approah in those domains.
A ritial dierene between Horvitz's work and our work is that LookOut does not
address the possibility of not reeiving a (timely) response. Thus, omplex strategies are
not required. In the typial ase for LookOut, the agent has three options: to take some
ation, not to take the ation, or to engage in dialog. The entral fator inuening the
deision is whether the user has a partiular goal that the ation would aid, i.e., if the user
has the goal, then the ation is useful, but if he/she does not have the goal, the ation is
disruptive. Choosing to at or not to at orresponds to pursuing strategy A.
7
Choosing
to seek user input orresponds to strategy U . Figure 17(a) shows a graph of the dierent
options plotted against the probability the user has the goal (orresponds to Figure 6 in
Horvitz (1999)). The agent's expeted deision quality, EQ
d
A
(t) is derived from Equation
2 in Horvitz (1999). (In other words, Horvitz's model performs more detailed alulations
of expeted deision quality.) Our model then predits the same seletion of strategies as
Horvitz does, i.e., hoosing strategy A when EQ
d
A
(t) is low, U otherwise (assuming that
only those two strategies are available). However, our model further predits something
that Horvitz did not onsider, i.e., that if the rate at whih wait osts arue beomes
non-negligible then the hoie is not as simple. Figure 17(b) shows how the EU of the two
strategies hanges as the rate of wait osts aruing is inreased. The fat that the optimal
strategy varies with wait ost suggests that Horvitz's approah would not immediately be
appropriate for a domain where wait osts were non-negligible, e.g., it would need to be
modied in many multi-agent settings.
6.2 Other Approahes to AA
Several dierent approahes have been taken to the ore problem of whether and when to
transfer deision-making ontrol. For example, Hexmoor examines how muh time the agent
has to do AA reasoning (Hexmoor, 2000). Similarly, in the Dynami Adaptive Autonomy
framework, a group of agents alloates votes amongst themselves, hene dening the amount
of inuene eah agent has over a deision and thus, by their denition, the autonomy of
the agent with respet to the deision (Barber, Martin, & Mkay, 2000b). For the related
appliation of meeting sheduling Cesta, Collia, and D'Aloisi (1998) have taken the approah
of providing powerful tools for users to onstrain and monitor the behavior of their proxy
agents, but the agents do not expliitly reason about relinquishing ontrol to the user.
While at least some of this work is done in a multiagent ontext, the possibility of multiple
transfers of ontrol is not onsidered.
Complementing our work, other researhers have foused on issues of arhitetures for
AA. For instane, an AA interfae to the 3T arhiteture (Bonasso, Firby, Gat, Kortenkamp,
7. We onsider hoosing not to at an autonomous deision, hene ategorize it in the same way as au-
tonomous ation
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Figure 17: EU of dierent agent options. The solid (darkest) line shows the EU taking
an autonomous ation, the dashed (medium dark) line shows the EU of au-
tonomously deiding not to at and the dotted line shows the EU of transferring
ontrol to the user. (a) Plotted against the probability of user having goal, no
wait ost. (b) plotted against wait ost, xed probability of user having goal.
Miller, & Slak, 1997) has been implemented to solve human-mahine interation problems
experiened in a number of NASA projets (Brann, Thurman, & Mithell, 1996). The
experienes showed that interation with the system was required all the way from the
deliberative layer through to detailed ontrol of atuators. The AA ontrols at all layers
are enapsulated in what is referred to as the 3T's fourth layer { the interation layer
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(Shrekenghost, 1999). A similar area where AA tehnology is required is for safety-ritial
intelligent software, suh as for ontrolling nulear power plants and oil reneries (Musliner
& Krebsbah, 1999). That work has resulted in a system alled AEGIS (Abnormal Event
Guidane and Information System) that ombines human and agent apabilities for rapid
reation to emergenies in a petro-hemial rening plant. AEGIS features a shared task
representation that both the users and the intelligent system an work with (Goldman,
Guerlain, Miller, & Musliner, 1997). A key hypothesis of the work is that the model needs
to have multiple levels of abstration so that the user an interat at the level they see t.
Interesting work by Fong, Thorpe, and Baur (2002) has extended the idea of tele-operated
robotis by re-dening the relationship between the robot and user as a ollaborative one,
rather than the traditional master-slave onguration. In partiular, the robot treats the
human as a resoure that an perform pereptual or ognitive funtions that the robot
determines it annot adequately perform. However, as yet the work has not looked at the
possibility that the user is not available to provide input when required, whih would require
the robot perform more omplex transfer-of-ontrol reasoning.
While most previous work in AA has ignored omplex strategies for AA, there is work
in other researh elds that is potentially relevant. For example, the researh issues ad-
dressed by elds suh as mixed-initiative deision-making (Collins, Bilot, Gini, & Mobasher,
2000b), anytime algorithms (Zilberstein, 1996), multi-proessor sheduling (Stankovi, Ra-
mamritham, & Cheng, 1985), meta-reasoning (Russell & Wefald, 1989), game theory (Fu-
denberg & Tirole, 1991), and ontingeny plans (Draper, Hanks, & Weld, 1994; Peot &
Smith, 1992) all have, at least superial, similarities with the AA problem. However, it
turns out that the ore assumptions and fous of these other researh areas are dierent
enough that the algorithms developed in these related elds are not diretly appliable to
the AA problem.
In mixed-initiative deision making a human user is assumed to be ontinually available
(Collins et al., 2000b; Ferguson & Allen, 1998), negating any need for reasoning about the
likelihood of response. Furthermore, there is often little or no time pressure or oordination
onstraints. Thus, while the basi problem of transferring ontrol between a human and
agent is ommon to both mixed-initiative deision making and AA, the assumptions are
quite dierent leading to distint solutions. Likewise, other related researh elds make
distintly dierent assumptions whih lead to distintly dierent solutions. For instane,
ontingeny planning (Draper et al., 1994; Peot & Smith, 1992) deals with the problem of
reating plans to deal with ritial developments in the environment. Strategies are related
to ontingeny planning in that they are plans to deal with the spei ontingeny of an
entity not making a deision in a manner that maintains oordination. However, in on-
tingeny planning, the key diÆulty is in reating the plans. In ontrast, in AA, reating
strategies is straightforward and the key diÆulty is hoosing between those strategies. Our
ontribution is in reognizing the need for strategies in addressing the AA problem, instan-
tiating suh strategies via MDPs, and the development of a general, domain-independent
reward funtion that leads to an MDP hoosing the optimal strategy for a partiular situ-
ation.
Similarly, another related researh area is meta-reasoning (Russell & Wefald, 1989).
Meta-reasoning work looks at online reasoning about omputation. A type of meta-reasoning,
most losely related to AA, hooses between sequenes of omputations with dierent ex-
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peted quality and running time, subjet to the onstraint that hoosing the highest-quality
sequene of omputations is not possible (beause it takes too long) (Russell & Wefald,
1989). The idea is to treat omputations as ations and \meta-reason" about the EU of
doing ertain ombinations of omputation and (base-level) ations. The output of meta-
reasoning is a sequene of omputations that are exeuted in sequene. AA parallels meta-
reasoning if we onsider reasoning about transferring ontrol to entities as reasoning about
seleting omputations, i.e., we think of entities as omputations. However, in AA, the
aim is to have one entity make a high-quality deision, while in meta-reasoning, the aim is
for a sequene of omputations to have some high quality. Moreover, the meta-reasoning
assumption that omputations are guaranteed to return a timely result if exeuted, does
not apply in AA. Finally, meta-reasoning looks for a sequene of omputations that use a
xed amount of time, while AA reasons about trading o extra time for a better deision
(possibly buying time with a D ation). Thus, algorithms developed for meta-reasoning are
not appliable to AA.
Another researh area with oneptual similarity to AA is the eld of anytime algo-
rithms (Zilberstein, 1996). An anytime algorithm quikly nds an initial solution and then
inrementally tries to improve the solution until stopped. The AA problem is similar when
we assume that the agent itself an make an immediate deision, beause the problem then
has the property that a solution is always available (an important property of an anytime
algorithm). However, this will not be the ase in general, i.e., the agent will not always have
an answer. Furthermore, anytime algorithms do not generally need to deal with multiple,
distributed entities, nor do they have the opportunity to hange oordination (i.e., using a
D ation).
Multi-proessor sheduling looks at assigning tasks to nodes in order to meet ertain
time onstraints (Stankovi et al., 1985). If entities are thought of as \nodes", then AA
is also about assigning tasks to nodes. In multiproessor sheduling, the quality of the
omputation performed on eah of the nodes is usually assumed to be equal, i.e., the nodes
are homogeneous. Thus, reasoning that trades o quality and time is not required, as it is in
AA. Moreover, deadlines are externally imposed for multi-proessor sheduling algorithms,
rather than being exibly reasoned about as in AA. Multi-proessor sheduling algorithms
an sometimes deal with a node rejeting a task beause it annot fulll the time onstraints
or network failures. However, while the AA problem fouses on failure to get a response
as a entral issue and load balaning as an auxiliary issue, multi-proessor sheduling has
the opposite fous. The dierene in fous leads to algorithms being developed in the
multiproessor sheduling ommunity that are not well suited to AA (and vie versa).
7. Conlusions
Adjustable autonomy is ritial to the suess of real-world agent systems beause it allows
an agent to leverage the skills, resoures and deision-making abilities of other entities,
both human and agent. Previous work has addressed AA in the ontext of single-agent
and single-human senarios, but those solutions do not sale to inreasingly omplex multi-
agent systems. In partiular, previous work used rigid, one-shot transfers of ontrol that
did not onsider team osts and, more importantly, did not onsider the possibility of ostly
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misoordination between team members. Indeed, when we applied a rigid transfer-of-ontrol
approah to a multi-agent ontext, it failed dramatially.
This artile makes three key ontributions to enable the appliation of AA in more
omplex multiagent domains. First, the artile introdues the notion of a transfer-of-ontrol
strategy. A transfer-of-ontrol strategy onsists of a onditional sequene of two types
of ations: (i) ations to transfer deision-making ontrol and (ii) ations to hange an
agent's pre-speied oordination onstraints with team members, aimed at minimizing
misoordination osts. Suh strategies allow agents to plan sequenes of transfer-of-ontrol
ations. Thus, a strategy allows the agent to transfer ontrol to entities best able to make
deisions, buy more time for deisions to be made and still avoid misoordination | even
if the entity to whih ontrol is transferred fails to make the deision. Additionally, we
introdued the idea of hanging oordination onstraints as a mehanism for giving the
agent more opportunity to provide high-quality deisions, and we showed that suh hanges
an, in some ases, be an eetive way of inreasing the team's expeted utility.
The seond ontribution of this artile is a mathematial model of AA strategies that
allows us to alulate the expeted utility of suh strategies. The model shows that while
omplex strategies are indeed better than single-shot strategies in some situations, they are
not always superior. In fat, our analysis showed that no partiular strategy dominates
over the whole spae of AA deisions; instead, dierent strategies are optimal in dierent
situations.
The third ontribution of this artile is the operationalization of the notion of transfer-
of-ontrol strategies via Markov Deision Proesses and a general reward funtion that
leads the MDP to nd optimal strategies in a multiagent ontext. The general, domain-
independent reward funtion should allow our approah to potentially be applied to other
multi-agent domains. We implemented, applied, and tested our MDP approah to AA rea-
soning in a real-world appliation supporting researhers in their daily ativities. Daily use
showed the MDP approah to be eetive at balaning the need to avoid risky autonomous
deisions and the potential for ostly misoordination. Furthermore, detailed experiments
showed that the poliies produed by the MDPs have desirable properties, suh as transfer-
ring ontrol to the user less often when the probability of getting a timely response is low.
Finally, pratial experiene with the system revealed that users require the ability to ma-
nipulate the AA reasoning of the agents. To this end, we introdued a onstraint language
that allows the user to limit the range of behavior the MDP an exhibit. We presented an
algorithm for proessing suh onstraints, and we showed it to have the desirable property
of reduing the time it takes to nd optimal poliies.
8. Future Work
The model of AA presented in this artile is suÆiently rih to model a wide variety of
interesting appliations. However, there are some key fators that are not modeled in the
urrent formulation that are required for some domains. One key issue is to allow an agent
to fator the AA reasoning of other agents into its own AA reasoning. For instane, in
the Elves domain, if one agent is likely to deide to delay a meeting, another agent may
wait until that deision and avoid asking its user. Conversely, if an agent about to take
bak ontrol of a deision knows another agent is going to ontinue waiting for user input,
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it might also ontinue to wait for input. Suh interations will substantially inrease the
omplexity of the reasoning an agent needs to perform. In this artile, we have assumed
that the agent is nding a transfer-of-ontrol strategy for a single, isolated deision. In
general, there will be many deisions to be made at one and the agent will not be able to
ignore the interations between those deisions. For example, transferring ontrol of many
deisions to a user, redues the probability of getting a prompt response to any of them.
Reasoning about these interations will add further omplexity to the required reasoning of
the agent.
Another fous of future work will be generalizing the AA deision making to allow other
types of onstraints | not just oordination onstraints | to be taken into aount. This
would in turn require generalization of the onept of a D ation to inlude other types
of stop-gap ations and may lead to dierent types of strategies an agent ould pursue.
Additionally, transfer-of-ontrol ations ould be generalized to allow parts of a deision
to be transferred, e.g., to allow input to be reeived from a user without transferring total
ontrol to him/her, or allow ations that ould be performed ollaboratively. Similarly, if
ations were reversible, the agent ould make the deision but allow the user to reverse
it. We hope that suh generalizations would improve the appliability of our adjustable
autonomy researh in more omplex domains.
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Appendix A: An Example Instantiation of the Model
In this Appendix, we present a detailed look at one possible instantiation of the AA model.
We use that instantiation to alulate the EU of ommonly used strategies and show how
that EU varies with parameters suh as the rate of wait ost arual and the time at whih
transfers of ontrol are performed. In this instantiation, the agent, A, has only one entity to
all on for a deision (i.e., the user U), hene E = fA;Ug. For W(t), we use the following
funtion:
W(t) =
(
! exp
!t
t  
! exp
!
otherwise
(15)
The exponential wait ost funtion reets the idea that a big delay is muh worse than
a small one. A polynomial or similar funtion ould have also been used but an exponential
was used sine it makes the mathematis leaner. For the probability of response we use:
P
>
(t) =  exp
 t
. A Markovian response probability reets an entity that is just as likely
to respond at the next point in time as they were at the previous point. For users mov-
ing around a dynami environment, this turns out to be a reasonable approximation. The
entities' deision-making quality is onstant over time, in partiular, EQ
d
A
(t) =  and for
EQ
d
U
(t) = . Assuming onstant deision-making quality will not always be aurate in a
dynami environment sine information available to an entity may hange (hene inuening
their ability to make the deision) however, for deisions involving stati fats or preferenes
deision-making quality will be relatively onstant. The funtions are a oarse approxima-
tion of a range of interesting appliations, inluding the E-Elves. Table 7 shows the resulting
instantiated equations for the simple strategies (For onveniene we let Æ =  !). Figures
18(a) and (b) show graphially how the EU of the eA strategy varies along dierent axes (w
is the parameter to the wait ost funtion, higher w means faster aruing wait osts and
p is the parameter to the response probability funtion, higher p means faster response).
Notie how the EU depends on the transfer time (T) as muh as it does on  (the user's
deision quality). Figure 18(d) shows the value of a D (as disussed earlier).
Figure 18() ompares the EU of the eDeA and estrategies. The more omplex the
transfer-of-ontrol strategy (i.e., the more transfers of ontrol it makes), the atter the
EU graph when plotted against wait ost (w) and response probability (p) parameters. In
partiular, the fall-o when the wait osts are high and the probability of response low is
not so dramati for the more omplex strategy.
Appendix B: Constraint Propagation Algorithm and its Corretness
In Setion 4.4, we examined the need for user-speied onstraints in onjuntion with
our MDP-based approah to strategies. We must thus extend the standard MDP poliy
evaluation algorithms to support the evaluation of strategies while aounting for both the
standard quantitative reward funtion and these new qualitative onstraints. This appendix
provides the novel algorithm that we developed to evaluate strategies while aounting for
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Figure 18: Equation 17, i.e., strategy eA plotted against (a) ! (i.e., w, the rate at whih
wait osts arue) and  (i.e., p the likelihood of response) and (b) T (transfer
time)and beta (the user's deision quality). () Comparing strategies eDeA and
e(dotted line is e). (d) The value of a D.
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Table 7: Instantiated AA EU equations for simple transfer of ontrol strategies.
both. We also present a detailed proof that our algorithm's output is the orret strategy
(i.e., the strategy with the highest expeted utility, subjet to the user-speied onstraints).
In the standard MDP value iteration algorithm, the value of a strategy in a partiular
state is a single number, an expeted utility U . With the addition of our two types of
onstraints, this value is now a tuple hF;N;Ui. F represents a strategy's ability to satisfy
the forbidding onstraints; therefore, it is a boolean indiating whether the state is forbidden
or not. N represents a strategy's ability to satisfy the neessary onstraints; therefore, it
is the set of requiring onstraints that will be satised. As in traditional value iteration,
U is the expeted reward. For instane, if the value of a state, V (s) = htrue; f
rs
g; 0:3i,
then exeuting the poliy from state s will ahieve an expeted value of 0.3 and will satisfy
required-state onstraint 
rs
. However, it is not guaranteed to satisfy any other required-
state, nor any required-ation, onstraints. In addition, s is forbidden, so there is a nonzero
probability of violating a forbidden-ation or forbidden-state onstraint. We do not reord
whih forbidding onstraints the poliy violates, sine violating any one of them is equally
bad. We do have to reord whih requiring onstraints the poliy satises, sine satisfying
all suh onstraints is preferable to satisfying only some of them. Therefore, the size of the
value funtion grows linearly with the number of requiring onstraints, but is independent
of the number of forbidding onstraints.
Following the form of standard value iteration, we initialize the value funtion over
states by onsidering the immediate value of the strategy in the given state, without any
lookahead. More preisely:
V
0
(s) 
*
_
2C
fs
(s); f 2 C
rs
j(s)g ; R
S
(s)
+
(19)
Thus, the state s is forbidden if any forbidden-state onstraints immediately apply, and
it satises those required-state onstraints that immediately apply. As in standard value
iteration, the expeted utility is the value of the reward funtion in the state.
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In value iteration, we must dene an updated value funtion V
t+1
as a renement
of the previous iteration's value funtion, V
t
. States beome forbidden in V
t+1
if they
violate any onstraints diretly or if any of their suessors are forbidden aording to V
t
.
States satisfy requirements if they satisfy them diretly or if all of their suessors satisfy
the requirement. To simplify the following expressions, we dene S
0
to be the set of all
suessors: fs
0
2 SjM
a
ss
0
> 0g. The following expression provides the preise denition of
this iterative step:
V
t+1
(s) max
a2A
*
_
2C
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(s) _
_
2C
fa
(s; a) _
_
V
t
(s
0
)=hF
0
;N
0
;U
0
i;s
0
2S
0
F
0
;
f 2 C
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(s)g [ f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0
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(20)
Just as in standard value iteration, this iterative step speies a maximization over all pos-
sible hoies of ation. However, with our two additional omponents to represent the value
of the strategy with respet to the onstraints, we no longer have an obvious omparison
funtion to use when evaluating andidate ations. Therefore, we perform the maximization
using the following preferene ordering, where x  y means that y is preferable to x:
ht;N;Ui 


f;N
0
; U
0

hF;N;Ui 


F;N
0
 N;U
0

hF;N;Ui 


F;N;U
0
> U

In other words, satisfying a forbidden onstraint takes highest priority, satisfying more
requiring onstraints is seond, and inreasing expeted value is last. We dene the optimal
ation, P (s), as the ation, a, for whih the nal V (s) expression above is maximized.
Despite the various set operations in Equation 20, the time omplexity of this iteration
step exeeds that of standard value iteration by only a linear fator, namely the number
of onstraints, jC
fs
j + jC
fa
j + jC
rs
j + jC
ra
j. The eÆieny derives from the fat that the
onstraints are satised/violated independently of eah other. The determination of whether
a single onstraint is satised/violated requires no more time than that of standard value
iteration, hene the overall linear inrease in time omplexity.
Beause expeted value has the lowest priority, we an separate the iterative step of
Equation 20 into two phases: onstraint propagation and value iteration. During the
onstraint-propagation phase, we ompute only the rst two omponents of our value fun-
tion, hF;N; i. The value-iteration phase omputes the third omponent, h; ; Ui, as in
standard value iteration. However, we an ignore any state/ation pairs that, aording
to the results of onstraint propagation, violate a forbidding onstraint (ht;N; i) or re-
quiring onstraint (hf;N  C
rs
[ C
ra
; i). Beause of the omponent-wise independene of
Equation 20, the two-phase algorithm omputes an idential value funtion as the original,
single-phase version (over state/ation pairs that satisfy all onstraints).
In the rest of this Appendix we provide a proof of the orretness of the modied value
iteration poliy. Given a poliy, P , onstruted aording to the above algorithm, we must
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show that an agent following P will obey the onstraints speied by the user. If the agent
begins in some state, s 2 S, we must prove that it will satisfy all of its onstraints if and only
if V (s) = hf;C
ra
[ C
rs
; Ui. We prove the results for forbidding and requiring onstraints
separately.
Theorem 1 An agent following poliy, P , with value funtion, V , generated as in Se-
tion 4.4, from any state s 2 S will violate a forbidding onstraint with probability zero if
and only if V (s) = hf;N;Ui (for some U and N).
Proof: We prove the theorem by indution over subspaes of the states, lassied by
how \lose" they are to violating a forbidding onstraint. More preisely, we partition the
state spae, S, into subsets, S
k
, dened to ontain all states that an violate a forbidding
onstraint after a minimum of k state transitions. In other words, S
0
ontains those states
that violate a forbidding onstraint diretly; S
1
ontains those states that do not violate
any forbidding onstraints themselves, but have a suessor state (following the transition
probability funtion, P ) that does (i.e., a suessor state in S
0
); S
2
ontains those states
that do not violate any forbidding onstraints, nor have any suessors that do, but who
have at least one suessor state that has a suessor state that does (i.e., a suessor state
in S
1
); et. There are at most jSj nonempty subsets in this mutually exlusive sequene. To
make this partition exhaustive, the speial subset, S
1
, ontains all states from whih the
agent will never violate a forbidding onstraint by following P . We rst show, by indution
over k, that 8s 2 S
k
(0  k  jSj), V (s) = ht;N;Ui, as required by the theorem.
Basis step (S
0
): By denition, the agent will violate a forbidding onstraint in s 2 S
0
.
Therefore, either 9 2 C
fs
suh that (s) = t or 9 2 C
fa
suh that (s; P (s)) = t, so we
know, from Equation 20, V (s) = ht;N;Ui.
Indutive step (S
k
; 1  k  jSj): Assume, as the indution hypothesis, that 8s
0
2
S
k 1
, V (s
0
) = ht;N
0
; U
0
i. By the denition of S
k
, eah state, s 2 S
k
, has at least one
suessor state, s
0
2 S
k 1
. Then, aording to Equation 20, V (s) = ht;N;Ui, beause the
disjuntion over S
0
must inlude s
0
, for whih F
0
= t.
Therefore, by indution, we know that for all s 2 S
k
(0  k  jSj), V (s) = ht;N;Ui.
We now show that 8s 2 S
1
, V (s) = hf;N;Ui. We prove, by indution over t, that, for any
state, s 2 S
1
, V
t
(s) = hf;N;Ui.
Basis step (V
0
): By denition, if s 2 S
1
, there annot exist any  2 C
fs
suh that
(s) = t. Then, from Equation 19, V
0
(s) =


f;N
0
; U
0

.
Indutive step (V
t
; t > 0): Assume, as the indutive hypothesis, that, for any s
0
2 S
1
,
V
t 1
(s
0
) = hf;N
0
; U
0
i. We know that V
t
(s) =


f;N
t
; U
t

if and only if all three disjuntions
in Equation 20 are false. The rst is false, as desribed in the basis step. The seond term
is similarly false, sine, by the denition of S
1
, there annot exist any  2 C
fa
suh that
(s; P (s)) = t. In evaluating the third term, we rst note that S
0
 S
1
. In other words,
all of the suessor states of s are also in S
1
(if suessor s
0
2 S
k
for some nite k, then
s 2 S
k+1
). Sine all of the suessors are in S
1
, we know, by the indutive hypothesis, that
the disjuntion over V
t 1
in all these suessors is false. Therefore, all three disjuntive
terms in Equation 20 are false, so V
t
(s) =


f;N
t
; U
t

.
Therefore, by indution, we know that for all s 2 S
1
, V (s) = hf;N;Ui. By the denition
of the state partition, these two results prove the theorem as required. 2
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Theorem 2 An agent following poliy, P , with value funtion, V , generated as desribed
in Setion 4.4, from any state s 2 S will satisfy eah and every requiring onstraint with
probability one if and only if V (s) = hF;C
ra
[C
rs
; Ui (for some U and F ).
Proof Sketh: The proof parallels that of Theorem 1, but with a state partition, S
k
,
where k orresponds to the maximum number of transitions before satisfying a requiring
onstraint. However, here, states in S
1
are those that violate the onstraint, rather than
satisfy it. Some yles in the state spae an prevent a guarantee of satisfying a requiring
onstraint within any xed number of transitions, although the probability of satisfation
in the limit may be 1. In our urrent onstraint semantis, we have deided that suh a
situation fails to satisfy the onstraint, and our algorithm behaves aordingly. Suh yles
have no eet on the handling of forbidding onstraints, where, as we saw for Theorem 1,
we need onsider only the minimum-length trajetory. 2
The proofs of the two theorems operate independently, so the poliy-speied ation will
satisfy all onstraints, if suh an ation exists. The preedene of forbidding onstraints
over requiring ones has no eet on the optimal ation in suh states. However, if there
are oniting forbidding and requiring onstraints in a state, then the preferene ordering
auses the agent to hoose a poliy that satises the forbidding onstraint and violates
a requiring onstraint. The agent an make the opposite hoie if we simply hange the
preferene ordering from Setion 4.4. Regardless of the hoie, from Theorems 1 and 2,
the agent an use the value funtion, V , to identify the existene of any suh violation and
notify the user of the violation and possible onstraint onit.
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